No Terroir in the Cold? A Note on the Geography of Geographical Indications

Huysmans, Martijn; Swinnen, Johan

doi:10.1111/1477-9552.12328

Cited by 38 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Domestically, GI policy has been a means of protecting differentiated agricultural products from cheaper competition (Huysmans & Swinnen, 2019;Meloni & Swinnen, 2018;Raustiala & Munzer, 2007, p. 342). In trade, EU protection of GIs within the single market is a defensive tool, functioning as a prohibitive non-tariff barrier to imported imitations.…”

Section: Eu Gi Policy and The War On Terroirmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the vast majority of GIs is concentrated in the Southern Five: France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. These five countries are strong supporters of mandatory origin labeling of all foods on the EU Single Market (Wanat & Hanke Vela, 2019), and have over 70% of all EU food GIs, and 80% of wine GIs (Huysmans & Swinnen, 2019). Figure 1 illustrates the number of food GIs per country by September 2020.…”

Section: Eu Gi Policy and The War On Terroirmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…High demand for (external) GI protection is likely to stem from different sources such as better or more differentiated food, strong agricultural and GI lobbies, limited cost-competitiveness, public salience of GIs, and gastronationalism (DeSoucey, 2010;Huysmans & Swinnen, 2019;Wanat & Hanke Vela, 2019). Where gastronationalism is at play, the protection of a GI in a trade agreement is a symbolic affirmation of its value, an expression of national identity, and a source of pride.…”

Section: High-demand Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Exporting protection: EU trade agreements, geographical indications, and gastronationalism

Huysmans

2020

Review of International Political Economy

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One of the main objectives of EU trade policy is to establish wider protection for its regional specialty foods, known as Geographical Indications (GIs). In spite of US opposition, the EU has successfully considered additional protection for its GIs a red line in recent trade agreements. A key piece to the puzzle of this success is that whereas the literature has typically treated trade and non-trade issues as a dichotomy, GI protection encompasses both trade and non-trade aspects. In the EU, trade agreements are negotiated by the Commission but require member state approval. Both Greece and Italy have threatened not to ratify CETA over insufficient GI protection, so GIs clearly matter. This article develops and tests a theory of GI protection using new data on GIs listed for protection in 11 recent EU trade agreements. It finds that EU trade agreements are more likely to protect GIs with higher sales values and from countries in the South of Europe, where GIs are highly salient because of gastronationalism. These findings illustrate how economic, cultural and political factors shape and enable EU policy exports through trade agreements.

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Section: Eu Gi Policy and The War On Terroirmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Eu Gi Policy and The War On Terroirmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: High-demand Countriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Exporting protection: EU trade agreements, geographical indications, and gastronationalism

Huysmans

2020

Review of International Political Economy

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“…With income growth and globalization, consumers are interested in local foods, while farm groups see it as a potential way of marketing and protecting their products. At the policy front, this has resulted in regulations on geographical indications (GI)-an issue that has created tensions in trade negotiations (Josling 2006;Huysmans and Swinnen 2019;Raimondi et al 2020).…”

Section: Political Coalitions In Agricultural and Food Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies

Swinnen

2018

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Food and agriculture have been subject to heavy-handed government interventions throughout much of history and across the globe, both in developing and developed countries.1 Political considerations are crucial to understand these policies since almost all agricultural and food policies have redistributive effects and are therefore subject to lobbying and pressure from interest groups and used by decision-makers to influence society for both economic and political reasons. Some policies, such as import tariffs or export taxes, have clear distributional objectives and reduce total welfare by introducing distortions in the economy. Other policies, such as food standards, land reforms, or public investments in agricultural research, may increase total welfare but at the same time also have distributional effects. These distributional effects will influence the preferences of different interest groups and thus trigger political action.The inherent interlinkage between efficiency and equity issues in policymaking meant that for much of history, economics and politics were closely related disciplines, often written about by the same authors, as reflected in the works of the original architects of the economics discipline-Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, and so on. In the late 19th century the economics discipline started separating itself from the "political economy" framework. The revival (or return) of political economy started in the 1950s and 1960s and was referred to as "neoclassical political economy" or "new political economy," as economists started using their economic tools to analyze how incentives of political agents and constraints of political institutions influenced political decision-making. The start of this field is often associated with 1 This chapter is a revised version of J. Swinnen, "The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies," chapter 21 in Handbook of Agricultural Economics, edited by G. Cramer, K. P. Paudel, and A. Schmitz, 381-398 (Oxon, UK: Routledge Publications, 2018). The material is reproduced with permission of the Licensor through PLSclear. For a more extensive discussion on all the issues discussed in this chapter and data illustrations, see also Swinnen (2018).

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“…The notion that the geographical origin of a product determines its quality is often called 'terroir'. The number and importance of GIs in policy and trade is rapidly growing (Huysmans and Swinnen, 2019). While several studies have explored the economics of GIs, there has been limited attention to the optimal size of a GI.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Size of Terroir: A Theoretical Note on Economics and Politics of Geographical Indications

Deconinck¹,

Swinnen²

2020

J Agricultural Economics

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Geographical indications (GI) certify the geographical origins of a product and delineate the specific area in which the certified product must be produced. Despite a large literature on the economics of GIs, few papers have explored the question of the optimal size of GI regions. This note presents a flexible conceptual framework to explore the economics and politics of the delimitation of a GI. The general framework describes the efficiency and distributional effects of the size of a GI and shows how this affects interest groups’ incentives to influence government decision‐making.

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No Terroir in the Cold? A Note on the Geography of Geographical Indications

Cited by 38 publications

References 25 publications

Exporting protection: EU trade agreements, geographical indications, and gastronationalism

Exporting protection: EU trade agreements, geographical indications, and gastronationalism

The Political Economy of Agricultural and Food Policies

The Size of Terroir: A Theoretical Note on Economics and Politics of Geographical Indications

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