Religion, Context, and Constraint toward Strangers

Orbell, John; Goldman, Marion S.; Mulford, Matthew; Dawes, Robyn M.

doi:10.1177/1043463192004003004

Cited by 66 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Similar considerations apply to experiments that create ingroups or outgroups, or specially recognized ''status'' groups, which support differential behavior by facilitating the subconscious reading of intentions by bargaining pairs; subconscious, because the different groups are unaware of their differential behavior toward each other (17). Similar results are obtained in the study of natural populations thought to vary in ingroup strength (18).…”

Section: Five Principles Of Behaviormentioning

confidence: 58%

Intentionality detection and “mindreading”: Why does game form matter?

McCabe

Smith

LePore

2000

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

126

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, we find consistent differences in behavior between the normal and extensive forms. In particular, we observe attempts to cooperate, and in some treatments we observe the achievement of cooperation, occurring more frequently in the extensive form. Cooperation in this context requires reciprocity, which is more difficult to achieve by means of intentionality detection in the normal as opposed to the extensive form games we study. Our objective is to study behavior in the normal form representation of one of two extensive form bargaining games previously examined by using a variety of matching protocols (1). In the current study we limit the matching protocols to single play and to repeat play with the same pairs, and we study comparisons of the normal and extensive forms.Comparisons of behavior in the normal and extensive forms of various games have been made most notably in refs. 2 and 3. The latter's emphasis is on the rationality principles of iterated dominance and backward induction as factors in individual behavior in addition to whether behavior in a game is invariant to the form of its representation-all fundamental principles in game theory (4). Rapoport (2) and Schotter et al. (3) strongly rejected the invariance principle, but explication in terms of game theory was illusive: ''where we expected our rationality principles would predict behavioral differences across game forms, either no such differences appeared or they were not what we expected.' ' (ref. 3, pp. 446-447).Rapoport (2) provides transparent examples of two extensive form versions of the ''Battle-of-the Sexes'' game and the same game in matrix normal (strategic) form. His examples make clear how order-of-play information provides a principle that can better coordinate player strategies in the extensive forms. That principle, as we would describe it, derives from the human capacity to read another person's thoughts or intentions by placing themselves in the position and information state of the other person. Because of the example's transparency and special character, his experiments are conducted by using a three-person resource dilemma, a public good, and a pure coordination game.In our games we try to predict certain core features of the variation in behavior with the game form, but only by reaching outside of the traditional rationality principles of game theory to include concepts of reciprocity and ''mindreading,'' from evolutionary psychology. Our ultimate goal is to provide an empirical foundation for modeling this behavior in terms of distributions of types of player-some of whom have a disposition toward noncooperative behavior, whereas others are disposed toward cooperation.Our wellsprings are hardly new. The essence of our conceptual approach was stated 38 years ago: ''A normative theory must produce strategies that are at least as good as what people can do without them. More, it must not deny or expunge details of the game that can demonstrably benefit two or more players and that the players, consequently, should not expunge...

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Section: Five Principles Of Behaviormentioning

confidence: 58%

Intentionality detection and “mindreading”: Why does game form matter?

McCabe

Smith

LePore

2000

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

126

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“…Fiske, 1998). Orbell et al (1992) report a widespread belief, shared by people of both high or low religiosity alike, that more religious people are more cooperative. Our paper provides an incentive-compatible test of such beliefs, in terms of trust.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Religion and trust: An experimental study

Tan

Vogel

2008

Journal of Economic Psychology

298

193

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We investigate the relationship between religion and trust. Using a questionnaire, we measure: i) general religiosity, and; ii) the extent of religious beliefs, experience, and ritual. These are then analyzed with behavior in a trust game (Berg et al., Games and Economic Behavior, 1995), which we also extend by providing information of a potential trustee's religiosity in certain tasks. We find that trusting increases with the potential trustee's religiosity. The extent to which trusting increases with a trustee's religiosity, in turn, increases with a truster's religiosity. Trustworthiness also increases with religiosity, and at an increasing rate.

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“…27 Consider such type in a religious organization with selective cooperation. The marginal type, q 0 is determined by,…”

Section: Religion and Scienti…c Progressmentioning

confidence: 99%

Religious Beliefs, Religious Participation, and Cooperation

Levy

Razin

2012

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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Abstract:The paper analyzes the relation between religious beliefs, religious participation and social cooperation. In particular, we focus on religions that instill beliefs about the connection between rewards and punishments and social behaviour. We show how religious organizations arise endogenously, analyze their e¤ect on social interactions in society and identify a "spiritual" as well as a "material" payo¤ for being religious. We show that religious groups that are more demanding in their rituals are smaller, more cohesive, and are composed of individuals whose beliefs are more "extreme". We use our framework to analyze the response of individual beliefs and religious membership to correlated shocks in society, such as natural disasters or periods of prosperity.1 Department of Economics, LSE. Email: g.levy1@lse.ac.uk; r.razin@lse.ac.uk. We thank Stephen Hansen for valuable research assistance, and the editor of this journal and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.The ESRC (grant number RES-000-22-1856) and the ERC (grant number 210385) provided …nancial support.

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Religion, Context, and Constraint toward Strangers

Cited by 66 publications

References 12 publications

Intentionality detection and “mindreading”: Why does game form matter?

Intentionality detection and “mindreading”: Why does game form matter?

Religion and trust: An experimental study

Religious Beliefs, Religious Participation, and Cooperation

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