Religious Beliefs, Religious Participation, and Cooperation

Levy, Gilat; Razin, Ronny

doi:10.1257/mic.4.3.121

Cited by 59 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…The reason could be that, after controlling for ethnicity, religion will account for certain predispositions and attitudes. This coincides with the finding that respondents belonging to religious groups which are more demanding in their rituals, are more likely to cooperate (Levy & Razin, 2012). …”

Section: Regression Findingssupporting

confidence: 89%

“…Sheldon, Graham, Pothecary, and Rasul (2007) argue that disadvantaged social groups and some ethnic minorities are less likely to cooperate in surveys due to low levels of literacy, disengagement from government, and communication barriers. In contrast, respondents practicing a religion which is demanding in its rituals are more likely to cooperate according to Levy and Razin (2012). Moreover, respondents who have a history of taking part in a survey with few occasions of non-response are also likely to cooperate with in-survey requests (Mostafa, 2016).…”

Section: Consent Mechanisms Over Timementioning

confidence: 99%

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What influences respondents to behave consistently when asked to consent to health record linkage on repeat occasions?

Mostafa

Wiggins

2017

International Journal of Social Research Methodology

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This study constitutes the first longitudinal exploration of consent to link survey and administrative data. It examines variations in consent over time and explores the influence of the respondents' characteristics (both observed and latent) and the impact of the interviewers on consent co-operation. Respondent inclination to consent is modelled as a latent construct. Most respondents behave consistently over time. However, this consistency is not driven by a strong inclination to consent but rather by the circumstances of the respondents at the time of the interview and by the impact of the interviewers themselves. The findings also show that the change in consent behaviour over time is a clear indication that consent should be treated as a dynamic phenomenon at the individual level.

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Section: Regression Findingssupporting

confidence: 89%

Section: Consent Mechanisms Over Timementioning

confidence: 99%

What influences respondents to behave consistently when asked to consent to health record linkage on repeat occasions?

Mostafa

Wiggins

2017

International Journal of Social Research Methodology

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“…Modern contributions include McCleary (2003a, 2005), Guiso et al (2003), Cavalcanti et al (2007), Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008), Becker andWoessmann (2009), Kuran (2011), Botticini and Eckstein (2012) and Levy and Razin (2012), who emphasize the relationship to growth through the accumulation of human and physical capital; Stark et al (1996) and Swatos and Christiano (1999), whose main concern is the "secularization hypothesis"; and Roemer (1998), Scheve and Stasavage (2006) and Huber and Stanig (2011), who focus on the interplay between religiosity and the demand for redistribution.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth

2013

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This paper analyzes the joint dynamics of religious beliefs and scienti…c-economic development. It emphasizes in particular how this coevolution is shaped by (and feeds back on) political con ‡icts and coalition formation, along both religious and income lines. As part of our motivating evidence, we also uncover a new fact: in both international and cross-state U.S. data, there is a signi…cant negative relationship between religiosity and innovativeness (patents per capita), even after controlling for the standard empirical determinants of the latter.To shed light on the workings of the science-religion-politics nexus and its growth and distributional implications, the paper develops a model with three key features: (i) the recurrent arrival of scienti…c discoveries which, if widely di¤used and implemented, generate productivity gains but sometimes also erode existing religious beliefs (a source of utility for some agents)by contradicting important aspects of the doctrine; (ii) a government that can allow such ideas and innovations to spread, or spend resources to censor them and impede their di¤usion; (iii) a religious organization or sector (Church or churches) that can, at a cost, undertake an adaptation of the doctrine that renders it more compatible with the new knowledge.The model leads to the emergence of three types of long-term outcomes. The …rst is a "Secularization"or "Western-European"regime, with declining religiosity, unimpeded scienti…c progress, a passive Church and high levels of taxes and secular public spending. The second is a "Theocratic"regime with knowledge stagnation, extreme religiosity, a Church that makes no e¤ort to adapt since its beliefs are protected by the state, and also high taxes but now used to subsidize the religious sector. In-between these two is a third, "American" regime, which generally (not always) succeeds in combining unimpeded scienti…c progress and stable religiosity within a range where the state does not block new discoveries and the religious sector …nds it worthwhile to invest in doctrinal repair and adaptation. This regime features lower taxes than the other two, but with positive revenue or tax exemptions allocated to religious activities. We also show that, in this "American" regime, a rise in income inequality can lead the religious rich to form a "religious-right"alliance with the religious poor and start blocking belief-eroding discoveries and ideas. Inequality can thus be harmful to knowledge and growth, by inducing obscurantist, anti-science attitudes and polices.

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“…Benabou and Tirole (2006) describe a model in which individuals (or parents) censor information so as to distort their future selves'(or children's) beliefs. Levy and Razin (2012) model the choice of whether to be religious or secular as a choice that a¤ects future beliefs. Benabou (2013) shows that the choices of individuals to ignore information depend in equilibrium on others'choices and on the complementarities of their actions with others.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Coevolution of Segregation, Polarized Beliefs, and Discrimination: The Case of Private versus State Education

Levy

Razin

2017

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

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Abstract:In this paper we analyze the coevolution of segregation into private and state schools, beliefs about the educational merits of di¤erent schools, and labour market discrimination. In a dynamic model, we characterize a necessary and su¢ cient condition on initial levels of segregation and beliefs under which full polarisation of beliefs and long run labour market discrimination are sustainable. The model suggests a new perspective on the long term e¤ects of di¤erent policy interventions, such as integration, school vouchers and policies that are directly targeted towards in ‡uencing beliefs.

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Religious Beliefs, Religious Participation, and Cooperation

Cited by 59 publications

References 31 publications

What influences respondents to behave consistently when asked to consent to health record linkage on repeat occasions?

What influences respondents to behave consistently when asked to consent to health record linkage on repeat occasions?

Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth

The Coevolution of Segregation, Polarized Beliefs, and Discrimination: The Case of Private versus State Education

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