Relationship between priming and recognition in deterministic and probabilistic sequence learning.

Abstract

Exposure to a repeating sequence of target stimuli in a speeded localization task can support both priming of sequence-consistent responses and recognition of sequence components. In 3 experiments with both deterministic and probabilistic sequences, the authors used a novel procedure in which measures or priming and recognition were taken concurrently and asked whether these measures can be dissociated. In all of these experiments, both measures were above chance at the group level and no evidence of dissociation was found. Item-level analyses of the data in Experiment 3 did reveal dissociations in that (a) recognition judgments were affected by response speed independently of old-new status and (b) items that were not discriminated in recognition nonetheless showed priming. However, the authors show that these data, together with the group-level results, are compatible with a formal model in which priming and recognition are based on a single common memory variable.

Disruption of Sequential Priming in Organic and Pharmacological Amnesia: A Role for the Medial Temporal Lobes in Implicit Contextual Learning

“…Consistent with previous results (Schvaneveldt and Gomez, 1998;Shanks et al, 2003), a probable/improbable difference emerged quite early (within 200-300 trials). More importantly, the extent of sequence learning was similar across groups within each study: neither organic nor psychopharmacological amnesia impaired sequence acquisition.…”

“…However, priming and recognition clearly were not correlated: the organic amnesic and high-dose diazepam groups were equally impaired in terms of priming but differed in their recognition performance, while the low-and high-dose diazepam groups did not differ in recognition but did in terms of priming. Although the relationship between priming and recognition is a complex one that is still not well understood (Conroy et al, 2005;Kinder and Shanks, 2003;Shanks et al, 2003), and the difference in recognition performance between the organic and high-dose amnesics deserves further study, it cannot be argued that priming in the present studies was based on declarative memory.…”

“…Half of the sequences were familiar in that they comprised entirely predictable targets, and half were unfamiliar in comprising a series of unpredictable movements. We have demonstrated priming in these test trials in that familiar sequences are executed faster than new ones (Shanks and Perruchet, 2002;Shanks et al, 2003): as if they are attaining a state of response 'flow,' participants are able to use each stimulus and response as a cue for the subsequent one. Crucially, however, this test method allows us to determine how many preceding targets are needed to induce priming.…”

“…Rather than moving at random, the target followed a noisy repeating sequence in which on each trial its location was predictable with probability 0.85; on other trials (p ¼ 0.15) it appeared at an improbable location. Across a total of 900 (Study 1) or 1200 (Study 2) training trials participants therefore had the opportunity to learn the probabilistic sequential structure determining target location (Cleeremans and McClelland, 1991;Schvaneveldt and Gomez, 1998;Shanks et al, 2003). The precise nature of implicit learning, and what characterizes a learning episode as implicit, is controversial Shanks, 2005;Shanks and St. John, 1994); However, the serial RT task used in the present study is implicit in the sense that learning occurs in the absence of intention to learn (Cleeremans and Jiménez, 1998), can proceed near normally in amnesia (Reber and Squire, 1998), and the acquired knowledge is difficult to verbalize or recognize (Chun and Phelps, 1999;Willingham et al, 1989).…”

The conscious, the unconscious, and familiarity.

“…However, Destrebecqz and Cleeremans's account does not address the apparent development of conscious structural knowledge by an alternative route under explicit learning conditions, that which we postulate to result from hypothesizing about rules. Shanks et al (2003) proposed a single-system model that is based entirely on familiarity. They account for the apparent dissociations between measures of implicit and explicit knowledge as resulting from access to this single knowledge source being subject to independent errors.…”