The generation of conscious awareness in an incidental learning situation

Abstract

The purpose of the present experiments was to investigate the generation of conscious awareness (i.e., of verbal report) in an incidental learning situation. While the single-system account assumes that all markers of learning, verbal or nonverbal, index the same underlying knowledge representation, multiple-systems accounts grant verbal report a special status as a marker of learning because they assume that the nonverbal and verbal effects of learning rely on different memory representations. We tested these two accounts in two experiments in which we held the amount of learning in the nonverbal memory system constant while manipulating independent variables aimed at affecting learning in the declarative system. The results of both experiments revealed significant differences in verbal report between experimental conditions, but no significant differences in response times. Overall, these results provide clear evidence in favor of the multiple-systems account.

The “Not Letting Go” phenomenon: accuracy instructions can impair behavioral and metacognitive effects of implicit learning processes

“…In accordance with e.g. Willingham (1998);Haider & Frensch (2005);Hommel (2003); Logan (2002), we assume that all kinds of task processing (i.e., automatic and controlled task processing) obligatorily require a strategic process (the action plan) to establish the task goal and to activate the appropriate stimulus-response rules. In advance of task processing, this strategic process additionally establishes criteria which specify the range of expected response outcomes (or eVects).…”

“…Results of studies on implicit learning or skill acquisition focusing on such metacognitive judgments suggest that participants are highly sensitive towards diVerences in their Xuency of processing during learning (e.g., Buchner, SteVens, Erdfelder, & Rothkegel, 1997;Haider & Frensch, 2005). It is worth mentioning that these "Xuency-judgments" by no means imply that participants have any insight into what causes the faster or slower processing speeds (and, by deWnition, they should have no insight into any underlying implicit learning process).…”

“…As an incidental learning task, we used the Number Reduction Task (NRT; Frensch et al 2003;Haider & Frensch, 2005;Thurstone & Thurstone, 1941;Wagner et al 2004;Woltz, Bell, Kyllonen, & Gardner, 1996;Woltz, Gardner, & Bell, 2000). In this task, participants are shown a string of six digits on a computer screen (see Fig.…”

Studenti učitelství mezi tacitními a explicitními znalostmi

“…Pokud jedinci hledají příčinu odchylky od toho, co zakoušejí, s tím, co očekávali, pak ve výše zmíněném kontextu dochází k produkci správné znalosti o příčinách těchto odchylek. Tato hypotéza je podpořena několika empirickými výzkumy (Runger & Frensch, 2008;Haider & Frensch, 2005 Damasio, 2010, s. 93-121). Původně bylo prediktivní kódování navrženo jako model vizuální percepce (Barlow, 1961).…”

Sequential motor skill : cognition, perception and action

“…For example, learners may show sequence-related performance gains, but at the same time claim to have no verbalizable knowledge about the nature of the learned sequence (or even claim to not have noticed the sequential structure). Explicit knowledge may be based on explicit sequence descriptions in the task instructions, but it is usually developed by testing hypotheses about the nature of the regularity of events (e.g., Haider & Frensch, 2005;Rünger & Frensch, 2010).…”