This paper investigates the dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge in an implicit learning paradigm. Two experiments employing the artificial grammar learning task explored the acquisition of unconscious and conscious knowledge of structure (structural knowledge). Structural knowledge was contrasted to knowledge of whether an item has that structure (judgment knowledge). For both structural and judgment knowledge, conscious awareness was assessed using subjective measures. It was found that unconscious structural knowledge could lead to both conscious and unconscious judgment knowledge. When structural knowledge was unconscious, there was no tendency for judgment knowledge to become more conscious over time. Furthermore, conscious rather than unconscious structural knowledge produced more consistent errors in judgments, was facilitated by instructions to search for rules, and after such instructions was harmed by a secondary task. The dissociations validate the use of these subjective measures of conscious awareness.
In hypnotic responding, expectancies arising from imaginative suggestion drive striking experiential changes (e.g., hallucinations) — which are experienced as involuntary — according to a normally distributed and stable trait ability (hypnotisability). Such experiences can be triggered by implicit suggestion and occur outside the hypnotic context. In large sample studies (of 156, 404 and 353 participants), we report substantial relationships between hypnotisability and experimental measures of experiential change in mirror-sensory synaesthesia and the rubber hand illusion comparable to relationships between hypnotisability and individual hypnosis scale items. The control of phenomenology to meet expectancies arising from perceived task requirements can account for experiential change in psychological experiments.
This article examines the role of subjective familiarity in the implicit and explicit learning of artificial grammars. Experiment 1 found that objective measures of similarity (including fragment frequency and repetition structure) predicted ratings of familiarity, that familiarity ratings predicted grammaticality judgments, and that the extremity of familiarity ratings predicted confidence. Familiarity was further shown to predict judgments in the absence of confidence, hence contributing to above-chance guessing. Experiment 2 found that confidence developed as participants refined their knowledge of the distribution of familiarity and that differences in familiarity could be exploited prior to confidence developing. Experiment 3 found that familiarity was consciously exploited to make grammaticality judgments including those made without confidence and that familiarity could in some instances influence participants' grammaticality judgments apparently without their awareness. All 3 experiments found that knowledge distinct from familiarity was derived only under deliberate learning conditions. The results provide decisive evidence that familiarity is the essential source of knowledge in artificial grammar learning while also supporting a dual-process model of implicit and explicit learning.
Classical conditioning theories of addiction suggest that stimuli associated with rewards acquire incentive salience, inducing emotional and attentional conditioned responses. It is not clear whether those responses occur without contingency awareness (CA), i.e. are based on explicit or implicit learning processes. Examining implicit aspects of stimulus-reward associations can improve our understanding of addictive behaviours, supporting treatment and prevention strategies. However, the acquisition of conditioned responses without CA has yet to be rigorously demonstrated, as the existing literature shows a lack of methodological agreement regarding the measurement of implicit and explicit processes. The purpose of two experiments presented here was to study the emotional value acquired by CS through implicit emotional and attentional processes, trying to overcome critical methodological issues. Experiment 1 (n = 48) paired two stimuli categories (houses/buildings) with high (HR) or low (LR) probabilities of monetary reward. An Emotional Attentional Blink revealed preferential attention for HR over LR regardless of CA; while pleasantness ratings were unaffected, probably due to the intrinsic nature of CS. Experiment 2 (n = 60) replicated the effect of conditioning on the Emotional Attentional Blink utilising abstract CS (octagons/squares). In addition increased pleasantness for HR over LR was found significant overall, and marginally significant for Aware but not for Unaware participants. Here CA was rigorously determined using a signal-detection analysis and metacognitive-awareness measurements. Bayesian analyses verified the unconscious nature of the learning. These findings demonstrate that attentional conditioned responses can occur without CA and advance our understanding of the mechanisms by which implicit conditioning can occur and becomes observable. Furthermore, these results can highlight how addictive behaviours might develop.
Blindsight and other examples of unconscious knowledge and perception demonstrate dissociations between judgment accuracy and metacognition: Studies reveal that participants’ judgment accuracy can be above chance while their confidence ratings fail to discriminate right from wrong answers. Here, we demonstrated the opposite dissociation: a reliable relationship between confidence and judgment accuracy (demonstrating metacognition) despite judgment accuracy being no better than chance. We evaluated the judgments of 450 participants who completed an AGL task. For each trial, participants decided whether a stimulus conformed to a given set of rules and rated their confidence in that judgment. We identified participants who performed at chance on the discrimination task, utilizing a subset of their responses, and then assessed the accuracy and the confidence-accuracy relationship of their remaining responses. Analyses revealed above-chance metacognition among participants who did not exhibit decision accuracy. This important new phenomenon, which we term blind insight, poses critical challenges to prevailing models of metacognition grounded in signal detection theory.
Instrumental conditioning is a crucial substrate of adaptive behaviour, allowing individuals to selectively interact with the stimuli in their environment to maximise benefit and minimise harm. The extent to which complex forms of learning, such as instrumental conditioning, are possible without conscious awareness is a topic of considerable importance and ongoing debate. In light of recent theoretical and empirical contributions casting doubt on the early demonstrations of unconscious instrumental conditioning, we revisit the question of its feasibility in two modes of conditioning. In Experiment 1, we used trace conditioning, following a prominent paradigm (Pessiglione et al., 2008) and enhancing its sensitivity. Success in this task requires participants to learn to approach rewardpredictive stimuli and avoid punishment-predictive stimuli through monetary reinforcement. All stimuli were rendered unconscious using forward-backward masking. In Experiment 2, we used delay conditioning to shorten the stimulus-outcome delay, retaining the structure of the original task but presenting the stimuli under continuous flash suppression to allow for an overlap of the stimulus, action, and outcome, as well as replacing monetary reinforcement with primary appetitive reinforcement. In both experiments, we found evidence for absence of unconscious instrumental conditioning, showing that participants were unable to learn to adjust their behaviour to approach positive stimuli and avoid negative ones. This result is consistent with evidence that unconscious stimuli fail to bring about long-term behavioural adaptations, and provides empirical evidence to support theoretical proposals that consciousness might be necessary for adaptive behaviour, where selective action is required.
While theories of consciousness differ substantially, the 'conscious access hypothesis', which aligns consciousness with the global accessibility of information across cortical regions, is present in many of the prevailing frameworks. This account holds that consciousness is necessary to integrate information arising from independent functions such as the specialist processing required by different senses. We directly tested this account by evaluating the potential for associative learning between novel pairs of subliminal stimuli presented in different sensory modalities. First, pairs of subliminal stimuli were presented and then their association assessed by examining the ability of the first stimulus to prime classification of the second. In Experiments 1-4 the stimuli were word-pairs consisting of a male name preceding either a creative or uncreative profession. Participants were subliminally exposed to two name-profession pairs where one name was paired with a creative profession and the other an uncreative profession. A supraliminal task followed requiring the timed classification of one of those two professions. The target profession was preceded by either the name with which it had been subliminally paired (concordant) or the alternate name (discordant). Experiment 1 presented stimuli auditorily, Experiment 2 visually, and Experiment 3 presented names auditorily and professions visually. All three experiments revealed the same inverse priming effect with concordant test pairs associated with significantly slower classification judgements. Experiment 4 sought to establish if learning would be more efficient with supraliminal stimuli and found evidence that a different strategy is adopted when stimuli are consciously perceived. Finally, Experiment 5 replicated the unconscious cross-modal association achieved in Experiment 3 utilising non-linguistic stimuli. The results demonstrate the acquisition of novel cross-modal associations between stimuli which are not consciously perceived and thus challenge the global access hypothesis and those theories embracing it.
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