Relationship between implicit false belief understanding and role play: Longitudinal study

Abstract

Pretend play is one of the earliest forms of children's imagination. While social pretend play (role play) may facilitate the development of theory of mind-including false belief understanding-theoretically, the reverse may be true; theory of mind may facilitate the development of role play. To clarify this relationship, the present longitudinal study examined whether toddler's implicit understanding of false beliefs predicted their role play during preschool years. We examined 18-month-old toddlers' looking time in an implicit false-belief task (Time 1). When the children were 4/5 years old (Time 2), children's parents answered a questionnaire on their child's engagement in role play, such as playing with an imaginary companion and impersonating an imagined character. Toddlers' looking time in the false-belief task at Time 1 predicted impersonation scores at Time 2. The results suggest that early theory of mind skills can facilitate children's role play.

Infants' performance in the indirect false belief tasks: A second‐person interpretation

“…Several subsequent studies replicated this pattern of findings (Moriguchi, Ban, Osanai, & Uchiyama, 2018 ; Song, Onishi, Baillargeon, & Fisher, 2008 ; Träuble, Marinovi, & Pauen, 2010 ) and even showed the complexity of infants' capacity to attribute false belief in different situations (Luo, 2011 ; Scott & Baillargeon, 2009 ; Scott, Baillargeon, Song, & Leslie, 2010 ; Scott, Richman, & Baillargeon, 2015 ; Song & Baillargeon, 2008 ) and to different agents (Burnside, Severdija, & Poulin‐Dubois, 2020 ). However, other researchers recently failed to replicate Onishi and Baillargeon's original results (Dörrenberg, Rakoczy, & Liszkowski, 2018 ; Powell, Hobbs, Bardis, Carey, & Saxe, 2018 ; Yott & Poulin‐Dubois, 2016 ) or replicated them just partially (Yott & Poulin‐Dubois, 2012 , where only the false belief condition was administered).…”

Is there continuity from implicit recognition of intentional action in infants to explicit mindreading in preschoolers? Systematic review of longitudinal evidence and theoretical implications (¿Hay continuidad entre el reconocimiento implícito de la acción intencional en bebés y la lectura de mente explícita en preescolares? Revisión sistemática de la evidencia longitudinal e implicaciones teóricas)

“…Only the study by Poulin-Dubois et al (2020) reported a statistical dissociation and longitudinal discontinuity between babies' and children's performance on implicit and explicit false-belief tasks (see Table 4), which was interpreted by the researchers in favour of TST regarding the limits of S1 processing and the independence between implicit (S1) and explicit (S2) processing of false beliefs (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009;Butterfill & Apperly, 2014). However, the majority of studies reviewed reported a pattern consistent with the relationship between implicit false belief at 18 months, evaluated via violation-of-expectations and gaze-anticipation tasks, and different verbal mindreading tasks at the age of 48, 50, 60 and 70 months, such as explicit false belief, attribution of moral intentions and adoption of a fictitious identity (Aschersleben et al, 2008;Kloo et al, 2020;Moriguchi et al, 2018;Sodian et al, 2016;Thoermer et al, 2012;H. M. Wellman et al, 2008).…”

A Review of Imaginary Companions and Their Implications for Development

“…Although most studies do not report on gender differences, it also appears that imaginary companions may have similar benefits for boys and girls. Imaginary companion status is related to outcomes such as theory of mind and sociability, but few studies report that the strength of these relationships varies by gender (Gleason, 2004; Moriguchi et al, 2018; Taylor & Carlson, 1997). Exceptions include Giménez-Dasí et al’s (2016) study of imaginary companions and emotion understanding, which found that girls with ICs demonstrated superior understanding of emotional states, and Caldeira’s (1979) study, which reported that for boys only, IC status predicted imaginativeness and positive emotionality during play, as well as decreased fearfulness and anger.…”

“…Given young children’s mastery of these skills during pretense, one could assume that the fundamentals of ToM must be in place in order for children to pretend play (Custer, 1996; Fodor, 1992). In fact, Dore et al (2015) have postulated that early ToM may promote children’s social pretend play, and some evidence suggests that early mental state understanding may predict play with imaginary characters (Moriguchi et al, 2018). However, research has also demonstrated that toddlers who engage in fantasy play do not have a thorough grasp of ToM, suggesting the opposite conclusion, that ToM is uninvolved in the emergence of pretense (Lillard et al, 2011; Taylor & Carlson, 1997).…”

“…Again, however, other studies have found no relationship between ToM and IC status (Davis et al, 2011, 2014; Taylor et al, 2004). If such a relationship exists, the literature is still unclear as to what extent ICs aid in the development of ToM or children with more advanced ToM skills are more likely to engage in IC play (Dore et al, 2015; Moriguchi et al, 2018). Methodologically rigorous studies employing longitudinal designs and valid batteries of ToM tasks may help further elucidate this relationship (Lillard & Kavanaugh, 2014).…”