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We propose a revised set of moral dilemmas for studies on moral judgment. We selected a total of 46 moral dilemmas available in the literature and fine-tuned them in terms of four conceptual factors (Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, Evitability, and Intention) and methodological aspects of the dilemma formulation (word count, expression style, question formats) that have been shown to influence moral judgment. Second, we obtained normative codings of arousal and valence for each dilemma showing that emotional arousal in response to moral dilemmas depends crucially on the factors Personal Force, Benefit Recipient, and Intentionality. Third, we validated the dilemma set confirming that people's moral judgment is sensitive to all four conceptual factors, and to their interactions. Results are discussed in the context of this field of research, outlining also the relevance of our RT effects for the Dual Process account of moral judgment. Finally, we suggest tentative theoretical avenues for future testing, particularly stressing the importance of the factor Intentionality in moral judgment. Additionally, due to the importance of cross-cultural studies in the quest for universals in human moral cognition, we provide the new set dilemmas in six languages (English, French, German, Spanish, Catalan, and Danish). The norming values provided here refer to the Spanish dilemma set.

While empathy is a century-old psychological concept, its study in non-human animals has become the focus of much recent scientific interest, as it promises to provide the clues to understand the evolutionary origins of our social and moral nature. A review of the comparative study of empathy is thus timely to complement and constrain anthropocentric views, and to integrate current findings. However, this is not an easy task. The study of animal empathy has developed using different paradigms, different concepts of the phenomena involved, and the absence of a systematic program. Herein, we carry out a comprehensive review of the literature on complex forms of empathy in non-human animals: sympathetic concern and empathic perspective-taking. In particular, we focus on consolation and targeted helping, as the best examples of each category. In so doing, we try to shed light on the current debate concerning whether these phenomena are exclusively human traits. First, we try to clarify the terminology and taxonomy of forms of empathy, providing operative criteria for these phenomena that are applicable to both human and non-human animals. Second, we discuss whether the available evidence qualifies such behaviour as empathic. Third, we aim to provide an integrative view of the field, clarifying the challenges and conditions to satisfy. We also hope to highlight the importance of the study of these processes for elucidating the evolutionary history of this capacity across the animal kingdom.