Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality

Abstract

Much theorizing on intentionality has proceeded on the assumption that intentionality can be fully explained in terms of functional role and causal/informational/correlation-type relations, i.e. that it can be "naturalized". This assumption remains widespread, but it has come under increased scrutiny over the past couple of decades. Brian Loar (1995) was among the most influential critics of the naturalization project, arguing that intentionality cannot be fully understood without the first-person perspective. He also articulated a picture of the mind on which all intentionality either is or originates from phenomenal intentionality, a kind of intentionality that arises from consciousness alone (2002, 2003). Since Loar's papers on this topic began circulating in the 90s, many philosophers have joined the phenomenal intentionality camp. 1 His rich and inspiring work has been highly influential, helping to usher into the mainstream what is increasingly being perceived as a main contender for a theory of intentionality. So far, proponents of phenomenal intentionality have been more concerned with defending their common view than adjudicating their differences. I think it is time to look more closely at internal disagreements within the phenomenal intentionality camp. One such disagreement runs particularly deep: according to relationalists, phenomenal intentionality is a kind of relation to mind-independent entities (for example, propositions); according to adverbialists (or, as I prefer to call them, aspect theorists), it is purely non-relational. The choice between these two fundamentally different conceptions of phenomenal intentionality is a crucial but largely overlooked one for the phenomenal intentionality research program. This paper aims to shed some light on this choice. Loar advocated for a non-relational conception of phenomenal intentionality. I happen to favor a relational view, but I recognize that this view faces many challenges. To echo Loar's words, "my homage to [Loar] will be expressed by my being driven to extremes" in defending a relational view of phenomenal intentionality in the face of his and others' objections to such views. 2 I will start by laying out the issue I want to talk about more precisely.

Truth and Content in Sensory Experience

“…Whether we can indeed do so remains to be seen. My point here is that on a picture of sensory experience like Papineau's, truth conditions must be 10 But see Ott (2016) and Bourget (2019b). specified from within.…”

Attenuated Representationalism

“…7-8, 2020, andforthcoming-a. primitive representational relation to clusters of properties. In response to charges of mysteriousness, Bourget (2019) says that consciousness is in fact mysterious but maintains that it is nonetheless relational in the ways described. Consciousness, by its very nature, puts us in contact with the relevant contents.…”

Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists

“…Allen, for instance, observes that naïve realists would accept that perceptual experiences have intentionality understood as directedness: for the naïve realist, 'our perceptual experiences are 'about' ('of', or 'directed at') those things in our environment that we are consciously acquainted with' (Allen 2016, p. 9). Similarly, Bourget (2019) notes that both naïve realists and those proponents of PI who take intentionality to be a relation hold that at least some experiences have an 'aboutness-underpinning relational structure'. 6 Moreover, naïve realists can account for various properties of intentionality discussed in the literature.…”

“…See, e.g.,Nudds (2009) for an overview. 13 For discussion of this kind of view, see, e.g.,Bourget (2019). 14Johnston (2004) defends a version of this approach.…”