Truth and Content in Sensory Experience

Abstract

In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau argues that sensory experiences are non-relational states that do not essentially have truth conditions. Papineau further claims that sensory experiences are not essentially representational and that truth conditions arise from environmental correlations. While I agree with the first part of the picture––that sensory experiences are intrinsic states that do not essentially have truth conditions––I don’t think Papineau follows his arguments to their proper conclusions. For even on a non-relational view of sensory states, it’s plausible that sensory experiences are essentially representational in that they constitute what we think, perceptually experience, or otherwise entertain. Further, because of this, the truth conditions of perceptual experiences cannot be entirely independent of the relevant non-relational features. If this is right, then we arrive at a version of representationalism that Papineau dismisses, a view he calls “pure phenomenal intentionalism.”