Attenuated Representationalism

Abstract

In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience, David Papineau offers some metaphysical reasons for rejecting representationalism. This paper overviews these reasons, arguing that while some of his arguments against some versions of representationalism succeed, there are versions of phenomenal intentionalism that escape his criticisms. Still, once we consider some of the contents of perceptual experiences, such as their perspectival contents, it is clear that perceptual experience does not present us with the world as we take it to be. This leads to a rather attenuated form of representationalism, perhaps one that even Papineau could come close to agreeing with.

Facing up to the problem of intentionality

“…For example, an explanation of intentionality on which intentionality is a relation to abstract propositions, which can obtain or fail to obtain, might automatically yield an explanation of conditions of satisfaction in terms of the obtaining of propositions. But on other views, the problem of explaining conditions of satisfaction is distinct from that of explaining intentionality (see, e.g., Kriegel 2008;Pitt 2009;Gow 2021;Mendelovici 2018Mendelovici , 2022Bourget and Mendelovici forthcoming). For example, on a view on which intentionality is a relation to items that do not automatically have conditions of satisfaction-say, because they are non-relational states-the question of how contents are supposed to correspond to the world such that they are considered to be satisfied is a further question that isn't automatically answered by the theory of intentionality.…”