Reinforcing the knowledge account of assertion

Blaauw, Martijn

doi:10.1093/analys/anr124

Cited by 28 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…Brown ; Douven ; Hill and Schechter , 109; Kvanvig and ; Lackey , 596, 598 ff and ; plus Levin , 369–370). Those who defend it include Benton ( and ), Turri () and Blauuw ().…”

Section: The Knowledge Version Of the Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Williams

2015

Philosophy Compass

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It is raining but you don't believe that it is raining. Imagine accepting this claim. Then you are committed to saying ‘It is raining but I don't believe that it is raining’. This would be an ‘absurd’ thing to claim or assert, yet what you say might be true. It might be raining, while at the same time, you are completely ignorant of the state of the weather. But how can it be absurd of you to assert something about yourself that might be true of you? This is Moore's paradox as it occurs in speech. What is the source of the absurdity? And why does it strike us that a contradiction is somehow at work when there is no contradiction in the content of what is asserted? In Section 2, I describe Moore's formulation of the paradox and evaluate his own solutions. In Section 3, I discuss Wittgenstein's influence in solving the paradox. In Section 4, I discuss Shoemaker's priority thesis that once the absurdity in belief has been explained, then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. In Section 5, I discuss work on omissive and commissive Moore‐paradoxical assertions, i.e. those of the forms p & I don't believe that p and p & I believe that not‐p. In Section 6, I discuss work on assertions of the form p & I don't know that p.

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“…Brown ; Douven ; Hill and Schechter , 109; Kvanvig and ; Lackey , 596, 598 ff and ; plus Levin , 369–370). Those who defend it include Benton ( and ), Turri () and Blauuw ().…”

Section: The Knowledge Version Of the Paradoxmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Williams

2015

Philosophy Compass

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“… Further conversational patterns have been adduced in favor of the knowledge norm. See Benton (), Benton (), and Blaauw (). For an overview, see Turri (, pp.…”

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Problems with Norms of Assertion

Pagin

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In this paper I draw attention to a number of problems that afflict norm accounts of assertion, i.e. accounts that explain what assertion is, and typically how speakers understand what assertion is, by appeal to a norm of assertion. I argue that the disagreements in the literature over norm selection undermines such an account of understanding. I also argue that the treatment of intuitions as evidence in the literature undermines much of the connection to empirical evidence. I further argue that appeals made to conversational patterns do not require the existence of any norms at all.

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“…Thus Williamson (), Hawthorne (, 23–24), Turri (, , ), Benton (, , forthcoming), Sosa (, 45–52), and Blaauw (), among others, all defend only (or primarily) the necessary condition. For discussion of a sufficiency condition, see Brown (, ), and Lackey as discussed below.…”

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Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge

Benton

2014

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Recent work on testimony and the norms of assertion considers cases of expert testimony. Thinking about expert testimony clarifies which epistemic goods figure in the expectations placed on experts for their knowledge. Examining the distinctive conditions of expert testimony and the assumptions hearers bring to such conversational contexts can provide broader lessons about how knowledge is represented by speakers, and how it is gained by hearers.Expert testimony is the focus of Jennifer Lackey's (2011, 2013) recent arguments over the norm of assertion. Her cases suggest that experts are plausibly held to a different epistemic standard when speaking as experts, where this standard concerns not only the quantity of an expert's epistemic support for what an expert asserts, but also the quality of that epistemic support. These cases seem to count against knowledge being sufficient for epistemically permissible assertion; and several others have followed Lackey in regarding such cases as important to adjudicating the debate over the norms of assertion and practical reasoning (Carter and Gordon 2011, Coffman 2011, McKinnon 2012, Carter 2014, Gerken 2014, Green 2014.I shall argue in this paper that relying on intuitions about such cases of expert testimony introduces several problems concerning expertise, expert knowledge, and the sharing of such knowledge through testimony. In particular, the cases used thus far are unstable, and refinements are needed to clarify exactly what principles are being tested and exactly what our intuitive judgements are tracking in such cases. But as we shall see, once refined, such cases raise more questions than they answer.The plan of this paper is as follows. §1 introduces the sufficiency principle for epistemically permissible assertion, and notes how it does and does not relate to the knowledge norm of assertion. §2 considers Lackey's notion of isolated second-hand knowledge, clarifying various notions of knowledge as 'isolated' and of seeking an expert's opinion. §3 exposes a significant 492 MATTHEW A. BENTON

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Reinforcing the knowledge account of assertion

Cited by 28 publications

References 4 publications

Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Problems with Norms of Assertion

Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge

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