Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Williams, John

doi:10.1111/phc3.12187

Cited by 17 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 106 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Moore's Paradox is that it seems absurd or contradictory to assert or even believe sentences of this form, despite their consistency. (Williams, 2015; Sorensen, 1988, 2018). These Moorean propositions seem intuitively irrational to believe and unwarranted to assert 33…”

Section: Potential Objections To Equdmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Endorsement and assertion

Fleisher

2019

Nous

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Scientists, philosophers, and other researchers commonly assert their theories. This is surprising, as there are good reasons for skepticism about theories in cutting-edge research. I propose a new account of assertion in research contexts that vindicates these assertions. This account appeals to a distinct propositional attitude called endorsement, which is the rational attitude of committed advocacy researchers have to their theories. The account also appeals to a theory of conversational pragmatics known as the Question Under Discussion model, or QUD. Hence, I call the theory the EQUD model. Motivating this account is a recognition that the speech act of assertion has two roles to play in research contexts. The first is the advocacy role, in which researchers assert a theory in order to advocate for it. The second is the evidential role, which is used to add to the common stock of information available to a field of inquiry. The EQUD model provides an account of warranted assertion for both these roles in research contexts. This success provides support for the theory of endorsement. It also provides support for information updating accounts of assertion.

show abstract

Section: Potential Objections To Equdmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many solutions that follow Shoemaker's (1996) priority thesis—that the explanation of the absurdity of believing MPs will also explain the absurdity of asserting MPs—should work to defend EQUD. For an overview of the literature on Moore's Paradox, see (Green & Williams, 2007; Williams, 2015).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Endorsement and assertion

Fleisher

2019

Nous

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“… See Moore (1942, 1944 for the original presentation of the paradox andWilliams (2015) for a recent overview of responses.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

True lies and Moorean redundancy

Wiegmann

Viebahn

2021

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to the subjective view of lying, speakers can lie by asserting a true proposition, as long as they believe this proposition to be false. This view contrasts with the objective view, according to which lying requires the actual falsity of the proposition asserted. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to pairs of assertions that differ only in intuitively redundant content and to show that such pairs of assertions are a reason to favour the subjective view of lying over the objective one.

show abstract

“…See e.g.Huemer (2010, p. 144) althoughWilliams (2013) questions whether belief-based explanations of Moore's Paradox at the level of thought straightforwardly translate to explanations of Moore's Paradox at the level of assertion. For a full discussion of speech-based forms seeWilliams (2015b).13 Important references with respect to these issues include but are certainly not limited toDouven (2006),Sorensen (2000) andSmithies (2012). For an excellent summary seeWilliams (2015a).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?

Cowie

2019

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore's Paradox. It is that Moore's Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. I focus on a constitutive norm relates that relates belief to knowledge. I develop this explanation. I then present a challenge to it. Normbased explanations of Moore's Paradox must appeal to a 'linking principle' that explains what is wrong with violating the constitutive norm. But it is difficult to articulate a plausible candidate linking-principle. I show this by canvassing the obvious candidates and articulating the problems with each. Keywords Moore's Paradox Á Constitutive norms Á Belief We can seemingly make judgments of the form: p, but I don't believe p. But there would be something problematic about doing so. What exactly is wrong with judgments of this form and what explains it? This is Moore's Paradox in its simplest form. It has been thought to reveal something interesting about the nature of belief, assertion or the nature of subjective experience itself. In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution. It is that Moore's Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. This kind of solution has been popular in the recent literature. 1 I will label and understand it as follows:

show abstract

Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey

Cited by 17 publications

References 106 publications

Endorsement and assertion

Endorsement and assertion

True lies and Moorean redundancy

Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About