Do constitutive norms on belief explain Moore’s Paradox?

Abstract

In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore's Paradox. It is that Moore's Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. I focus on a constitutive norm relates that relates belief to knowledge. I develop this explanation. I then present a challenge to it. Normbased explanations of Moore's Paradox must appeal to a 'linking principle' that explains what is wrong with violating the constitutive norm. But it is difficult to articulate a plausible candidate linking-principle. I show this by canvassing the obvious candidates and articulating the problems with each. Keywords Moore's Paradox Á Constitutive norms Á Belief We can seemingly make judgments of the form: p, but I don't believe p. But there would be something problematic about doing so. What exactly is wrong with judgments of this form and what explains it? This is Moore's Paradox in its simplest form. It has been thought to reveal something interesting about the nature of belief, assertion or the nature of subjective experience itself. In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution. It is that Moore's Paradox is explained by the existence of a constitutive norm on belief. This kind of solution has been popular in the recent literature. 1 I will label and understand it as follows:

Moore′s paradox generalized

“…43 Cowie (2020) has targeted explanations that "make Moore-paradoxical judgements not only wrong, but wrong in virtue of what it is for one to believe something at all" (p. 1686). As represented here, Moore's paradox is a much broader phenomenon than the one represented in the analyses targeted by Cowie's otherwise helpful criticism, particularly those that rely on a knowledge-norm of belief.…”

“…Huemer (2007) insightfully discusses the Moorean paradox for knowledge, which Moore himself hinted at but did not emphasise. And, for important criticism of Huemer's approach to the paradox, see Cowie (2020) and Williams (forthcoming). The focus on only the two "classical" forms of the paradox is exactly what we need here, as we consider the range of propositional attitudes for which the problem arises, as opposed to taking for granted that the problem arises only for belief (and knowledge).…”