Reforming urban sanitation under decentralization: Cross‐country learning for Kenya and beyond

Abstract

Motivation Across the Global South, unclear institutional frameworks undermine progress in improving services. Often, ongoing decentralization reforms reduce clarity further. Policy professionals working on institutional reform lack comparative models. Purpose To identify key challenges for the institutional arrangements for urban sanitation in decentralizing contexts, in Kenya and elsewhere, and to propose possible responses. Approach and methods We use key informant interviews and literature review in a problem‐driven analysis, drawing from three comparative case studies: South Africa, Indonesia and Tamil Nadu State. The analysis builds upon research on institutional effectiveness—co‐operation, collaboration and co‐ordination—rooted in game theory and elaborated in the 2017 World Development Report. Findings Three key problems in Kenya are identified: overlaps and competition around sector leadership at national and devolved levels; weak incentives for county governments to commit policy attention and finance, despite devolution; and limited regulatory oversight. Policy implications We identify a range of options for urban sanitation policy‐makers: (a) to engage non‐sectoral authorities in co‐ordinating multi‐sectoral issues across all levels of government; (b) to encourage political commitment to pro‐poor sanitation services at decentralized levels; and (c) to use incentive‐based and risk‐based approaches to regulate decentralized entities and strengthen local capacity for monitoring and enforcement.

Root causes of underperforming urban waste services in developing countries: Designing a diagnostic tool, based on literature review and qualitative system dynamics

“…Nevertheless, in many CDCs, the combined effect of (some) economic growth and continued urbanisation propels an increase of build-up area, population density, traffic and consumption that is much faster than ever witnessed in any developed country ( Henderson, 2010 ; Mangi et al., 2020 ; Varis, 2006 ). In many cases, and with regard to many urban services, this growth outpaces the capacity of administrative organisations to adapt themselves and their cities ( Bettini et al, 2015 ; Bidandi, 2015 ; Hill and Lindner, 2010 ; Mariathasan, 2016 ; Mason et al., 2020 ; Rice and Rice, 2012 ). This imbalance can be referred to as ‘Urbanisation Overhang’ or ‘Overurbanisation’ ( Rice and Rice, 2012 ).…”

Linking sanitation policy to service delivery in Rwanda and Uganda: From words to action

“…The poor are usually disenfranchised when services for the common good are privatized with minimal state oversight, posing accountability problems and compromising effectiveness (Bevir (Ed. ), 2011;Ekane, 2018;Mason, Oyaya, & Boulenouar, 2018) The "neo-developmental state," however, requires considerable planning and adequate resources, which are often lacking (van Vliet et al, 2011;Andrews et al, 2017;Woolcock, 2018). Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) presented one of the first elaborate accounts of two factors attributable to deviations in policy objectives during implementation.…”

“…Following two decades of studies in the UK and the US, Barrett (2004) summarizes key factors contributing to the implementation gap: unclear and ambitious policy objectives; multiplicity of actors involved in implementation; problems of communication and co‐ordination; value and interest differences between actors within and between organizations; problems of differing perspectives and priorities affecting policy interpretation and motivation for implementation; relative autonomy among implementing agencies. These factors manifest at different governance levels (Hjern, 1982) and also characterize the gap in many sectors in developing countries (Andrews et al, 2013), for instance in the water (Ménard, Jimenez, & Tropp, 2018) and sanitation sector (GLAAS, 2017; Ekane, 2018; Mason et al, 2018). Clearly, the implementation gap is a common problem but varies from one sector or context to another partly as a result of state implementation capacity.…”

“…Decentralization has gained pace and content in most countries in SSA with progress recorded in some facets—political, administrative, and fiscal (Ndegwa, 2002)—although the outcome has been mixed. Decentralization in most countries in SSA is reported to exacerbate the problem of unclear institutional frameworks by further reducing clarity (Mason et al, 2018). Ojambo (2012) observes how Uganda, which is reported to have exceeded expectations in all aspects of decentralization (Ndegwa, 2002), remains plagued by poor performance in terms of accountability and service delivery.…”

“Sanitation” in the Top Development Journals: A Review

“…Three major challenges, however, are identified in implementing this approach in Kenya: competition for sector leadership, lack of incentives at local government level, and poor regulation. However, as demonstrated by experience elsewhere, these challenges can be overcome through correct policies (Mason, Oyaya, and Boulenouar 2020). Carter and Danert (2003) emphasize the participation of the private sector in improving water and sanitation sectors.…”