Redefining the Performance Auditing Space

Kells, Stuart; Hodge, Graeme

doi:10.1080/23276665.2010.10779367

Cited by 8 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…10 10 Kells and Hodge (2010) studied the various modes of interaction between different oversight institutions undertaking performance audits in the Australian state of Victoria. …”

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confidence: 99%

The Seven Deadly Sins of Performance Auditing: Implications for Monitoring Public Audit Institutions

Kells¹

2011

Australian Accounting Review

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Performance auditing is a longstanding feature of democratic government in many countries. It aims to lift the efficiency and effectiveness of public sector organisations, but numerous authors have voiced scepticism about its ability to do so. From three decades of performance auditing literature, this paper distils seven critiques of performance auditing: ‘anti‐innovation’, ‘nit‐picking’, ‘expectations gap’, ‘lapdog’, ‘headline hunting’, ‘unnecessary systems’ and ‘hollow ritual’. The paper concludes that the critiques are not valid in all cases, but serve to categorise risks to be managed in the design of performance audit programs and associated institutional arrangements. In light of the critiques, the paper proposes desirable elements of frameworks for monitoring and reporting the performance of institutions with performance audit mandates.

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“…10 10 Kells and Hodge (2010) studied the various modes of interaction between different oversight institutions undertaking performance audits in the Australian state of Victoria. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Seven Deadly Sins of Performance Auditing: Implications for Monitoring Public Audit Institutions

Kells¹

2011

Australian Accounting Review

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“…No intuito de aumentar o controle, muitas vezes, são criados diferentes organismos de controle, os quais sobrepõem suas atividades (KELLS; HODGE, 2010). A duplicação das agências voltadas ao controle de resultados da administração pública, se por um lado pode aumentar a accountability e gerar uma competição saudável contra a baixa performance, podem também aumentar custos e dificultar a cooperação entre as agências (KELLS; HODGE, 2010).…”

Section: O Controle Nas Políticas Públicas De Mobilidade Urbanaunclassified

Controle Externo E Políticas Públicas De Mobilidade Urbana: O Caso Da Região Metropolitana Da Grande Florianópolis

Meyer

Günther²

2019

RGO

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A administração do setor público vem passando por intensas transformações. A demanda por melhores resultados leva ao aprimoramento da prática gerencial e da eficiência, apoiado pelo papel do controle. Entretanto, a atividade de controle pode levar a situações de conflito com os governos, em especial àqueles que buscam soluções inovadoras. O trabalho estuda o papel do controle externo no caso da integração do transporte público da Região Metropolitana da Grande Florianópolis. O referencial teórico é pautado principalmente nas contribuições de autores da teoria das organizações como Flyvbjerg (1998), Cunha e Tsoukas (2009) e Kornberger e Clegg (2011). A pesquisa é baseada no método do estudo de caso com característica qualitativa. Os resultados indicam que o controle externo inicialmente não auxiliou o governo a encontrar uma solução nova e definitiva de gestão para o enfrentamento da problemática da mobilidade urbana na região, mas em um segundo momento foi sensibilizado e tornou-se um parceiro desse inovador projeto de integração. Conclui-se que os órgãos de controle devem preconizar intervenções produtivas, construídas mediante colaboração e criatividade em prol da resolutividade dos problemas públicos.

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“…Research in Australia has examined various aspects of public sector audit, e.g. the association between the independence of public sector auditors and democratic accountability vis-à-vis their enabling legislation (De Martinis et al , 1998; De Martinis and Clark, 2003; Houghton and Jubb, 1998; Funnell, 1996; McCrae and Vada, 1997; Lawson, 2009); performance audit and new public management (Funnell, 1997; Kells and Hodge, 2009; Kells and Hodge, 2010; English and Guthrie, 2000; English, 2003; Scott, 2003); auditors-general and public accounts committees (Jacobs et al , 2007). Much of the discussion and commentary leading to these Australian studies is reflected in the Auditor-General Act 1997 which establishes the Auditor-General as an independent officer of the Parliament: S8(1) (Commonwealth of Australia, 1997).…”

Section: Prior Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The role of independence has also been emphasised in a proposed reconceptualisation of performance auditing – audit independence is seen as the first of five dimensions within which public sector performance auditing systems may be characterised (Kells and Hodge, 2009; Kells and Hodge, 2010; Kells, 2011).…”

Section: Audit Independence and Public Sector Accountabilitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Public sector audit in the absence of political competition

Mir

Fan

Maclean

2017

MAJ

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Purpose The paper aims to explore whether different models of public sector audit exist in China without adhering to the goals and objectives of public sector audit systems in democratic jurisdictions. Design/methodology/approach The study is based on a single embedded case study involving multiple methods of data collection including public documents, semi-structured interviews and site visits. The research methods and the analytical framework of the study draw on the concepts of political competition, public sector accountability and audit independence. Findings The study finds that the Chinese National Audit Office’s (CNAO) objectives derive from the neo-classical economic discourse and not from ideas of public accountability, as is the case in democratic parliamentary jurisdictions. The study finds that public sector audit in China functions in ways which are similar to that of internal audit. The CNAO may provide limited political and public accountability for Chinese public officials indirectly by enhancing their managerial accountabilities. Research limitations/implications The study goes against the prevailing view that supreme audit institutions which are part of the executive will lead to poor accountability of the public sector and increased public sector corruption. Practical implications The study suggests that enhancing managerial accountability in non-democratic (and pseudo-democratic) jurisdictions through public sector audit can by itself be of significant benefit. Further, such enhancements may also strengthen public sector accountability. Originality/value This paper fills a research gap by exploring public sector audit independence in a developing country with a unitary system of government.

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Redefining the Performance Auditing Space

Cited by 8 publications

References 7 publications

The Seven Deadly Sins of Performance Auditing: Implications for Monitoring Public Audit Institutions

The Seven Deadly Sins of Performance Auditing: Implications for Monitoring Public Audit Institutions

Controle Externo E Políticas Públicas De Mobilidade Urbana: O Caso Da Região Metropolitana Da Grande Florianópolis

Public sector audit in the absence of political competition

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