Recruitment and Retention of Legislators in Brazil

Santos, Fabiano

doi:10.2307/440310

Cited by 18 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Previous research on legislators in the United States, Canada, Japan, and Brazil shows that progressively ambitious office-holders make decisions in office with an eye toward their future goals and constituents (e.g., Clarke and Price, 1981;Cox, Rosenbluth, and Theis 2000;Santos 1999). Previous research on legislators in the United States, Canada, Japan, and Brazil shows that progressively ambitious office-holders make decisions in office with an eye toward their future goals and constituents (e.g., Clarke and Price, 1981;Cox, Rosenbluth, and Theis 2000;Santos 1999).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When to Risk It? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for the U.S. House

et al. 2006

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T he health of any democratic system depends on political ambition to generate a steady supply of quality candidates for office. Because most models of candidate entry assume ambition rather than model it, previous research fails to understand its roots in individual and institutional characteristics. We develop a two-stage model of progressive behavior that distinguishes between the formation of ambition for higher office and the decision to enter a particular race. Using data from a survey of state legislators, we demonstrate that the intrinsic costs and benefits associated with running for and holding higher office shape ambitions but do not influence the decision to run. For progressively ambitious legislators, the second-stage decision is a strategic choice about when to run rather than whether to run. Our research highlights how institutional characteristics that foster progressive ambition also increase the likelihood that national or local political conditions will be translated into meaningful choices at the ballot box.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When to Risk It? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for the U.S. House

et al. 2006

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“…Para modelar explicitamente as utilidades e probabilidades ligadas à opção de carreira, é útil seguir o modelo de utilidade esperada que já se mostrou altamente informativo no caso da Câmara de Deputados americana e já proposto para analisar o caso brasileiro (Santos, 1999). Kiewiet e Zeng (1993) sustentam que as escolhas entre {aposentadoria; reeleição} e entre {reeleição; cargos mais altos} não são independentes:…”

Section: Delineando a Teoriaunclassified

Estratégias para sobreviver politicamente: escolhas de carreiras na Câmara de Deputados do Brasil

Leoni¹,

Pereira

Rennó³

2003

Opin. Publica

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Os deputados federais brasileiros têm cinco escolhas principais de carreira política: retirar-se do jogo político (aposentar-se); concorrer a um cargo legislativo estadual (ambição regressiva); concorrer à reeleição (ambição estática); e concorrer a cargos mais altos (ambição progressiva). Este artigo monta um modelo para explicar as características das escolhas dos deputados com respeito a suas decisões de carreira na eleição de 1998. Sustentamos que não é a "natureza" da ambição política que determina a escolha, mas a avaliação dos riscos e custos contidos na decisão. Usou-se um modelo de regressão logit hierárquico para estimar o impacto das distintas estratégias políticas utilizadas pelos deputados em seus mandatos e suas campanhas eleitorais. Os principais resultados sugerem que os deputados com diferentes escolhas de carreira apresentam distintas estratégias durante seus mandatos, o que influencia decisivamente suas preferências do que fazem para sobreviver politicamente.
The Brazilian incumbent legislators have five major choices of political career: to withdraw from the elected political game (to retire); to run for local legislative position (regressive ambition); to run for re-election (static ambition); and to run for higher offices (progressive ambition). This paper built a model to explaining the features of incumbent legislators choices regarding their career's decisions in 1998's Brazilian election. We argue that it is not the "nature" of political ambition that determines legislators' choice, but the evaluation of the risks and costs entailed in the decision. The main findings suggest that incumbents with different career's choices present distinct strategies during their mandates, which have decisive influences on their preferences of what they do in order to survive politically

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“…Two studies of the Brazilian legislature fit Carey's general framework well: Fabian Santos's () study of Brazilian legislative careers since the 1950s found that Brazilian legislators sought careers in the executive branch, which is viewed as more prestigious. This accounts for a “zig zag” pattern Santos observed, in which legislators moved from the legislature, then to the executive branch, then back again.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently, there has been an increase in interest in candidate selection and retention (and broader questions of “candidate recruitment”), with a number of notable country‐level case studies (e.g. Camp ; Santos ; Langston ; Siavelis 2002). A recent volume edited by Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern () offers the first major systematic study of candidate recruitment and selection in Latin America and its scope includes both the legislative and executive branches.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, if seniority was used to determine leadership positions, incumbents were more likely to seek reelection. The findings of Santos () and Figueiredo and Limongi () are complementary: If legislators are “political entrepreneurs,” they should seek positions that improve their chances of either scaling the power ladder and/or remaining in relevant positions. In other words, they respond to those who control their “fates”—but they also pursue strategies based on available career opportunities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mixed-Member Election and Candidate Selection in Bolivia's 1993 and 1997 Elections

Centellas

2015

The Latin Americanist

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Mixed-member electoral systems became a popular choice for "electoral engineers" in the 1990s. Countries as diverse as Venezuela, Hungary, Lesotho, and Italy adopted the system. The assumption was that introducing single-member districts (SMDs) in countries that used list proportional representation electoral systems would introduce "constituency" oriented legislators who could be more easily held accountable to voters. This paper explores changes associated with the adoption of a mixed-member electoral system in Bolivia through a candidate-level analysis looking at differences in candidate profiles between two elections (1993 and 1997) and between two tiers (list and nominal). The paper relies on portion of a dataset (collected by the author) of Bolivian legislative candidates. The analysis shows mixed results: While SMD candidates were more likely to have municipal level political experience, there was no significant difference in the kind of legislative committees list and SMD candidates had served in.

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Recruitment and Retention of Legislators in Brazil

Cited by 18 publications

References 9 publications

When to Risk It? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for the U.S. House

When to Risk It? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for the U.S. House

Estratégias para sobreviver politicamente: escolhas de carreiras na Câmara de Deputados do Brasil

Mixed-Member Election and Candidate Selection in Bolivia's 1993 and 1997 Elections

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