Reciprocity, Triangularity, and Cooperation in the Middle East, 1979-97

Abstract

Does bilateral reciprocity or great-power influence (or both) promote the emergence of international cooperation in regional conflicts? Using machine-coded events data and vector autoregression, time-series analysis of 12 international dyads in the Middle East between 1979 and 1990 and 1991 and 1995 found bilateral reciprocity widespread in both time periods, characterizing nearly all dyads of sustained conflict and a majority of other dyads with various power and proximity characteristics. Significant triangular responses to U.S. actions occurred in only a few cases, although key ones—Iraq with its neighbors and Israel with Palestine. Neither bilateral reciprocity nor triangular response predicted changes in long-term conflict and cooperation. Rather, the presence of one or both of these response patterns appeared to be necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for regional states to increase long-term cooperation.

The Effect of US Foreign Policy on the Relationship Between South and North Korea: Time Series Analysis of the Post-Cold War Era

“…https://doi.org/10.1017/S1598240800007189 expectations of those arguing for the limits of using reciprocal strategies (Rubin and Brown 1975;Zartman 1997;Goldstein et al 2001). The results of this study indicate that reciprocity can indeed occur between a superpower (the United States) and a small country (North Korea).…”

“…Second, the use of a reciprocal strategy is limited when there is power asymmetry between states. It is difficult to develop cooperation if power between states is imbalanced because more powerful states do not fear the adversary's retaliation (Rubin and Brown 1975;Zartman 1997;Goldstein et al 2001). Third, it is difficult to change the image of the enemy, and international cooperation does not easily evolve even with reciprocal strategies (Larson 1988;Tetlock 1998 ;Goldstein et al 2001).…”

“…It is difficult to develop cooperation if power between states is imbalanced because more powerful states do not fear the adversary's retaliation (Rubin and Brown 1975;Zartman 1997;Goldstein et al 2001). Third, it is difficult to change the image of the enemy, and international cooperation does not easily evolve even with reciprocal strategies (Larson 1988;Tetlock 1998 ;Goldstein et al 2001). Fourth, when cooperative initiatives are absent, reciprocity might become "locked in"-but locked in on mutual competition or "defection" that generates an endless arms race (Patchen 1987, 176;Goldstein et al 2001,591).…”

Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence

“…However, Goldstein and his colleagues use events data to show that in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship from 1991 to 1995, Israel reciprocated Palestinian cooperation and conflict, whereas Palestine (defined as the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and other groups directing violence or cooperation toward Israel) did not reciprocate Israel's. Goldstein et al 2000. Thus the general case for Palestinian retaliation is somewhat weak.…”

Modeling Macro-Political Dynamics

“…In the spirit of the Bayesian approach (Gill 2002(Gill , 2004Jackman 2004, in progress),, these results are insensitive to alternative specifications of prior be- 4 Examples of these larger scale reduced form models in international relations are Goldstein and Pevehouse (1997), Pevehouse and Goldstein (1999), and Goldstein, Pevehouse, Gerner and Telhami (2001). 5 For example, in their simulation chapter, Erikson et al refer to endogeneity as a "nuisance" and a "nightmare" (2002,386).…”