Reciprocal reward promotes the evolution of cooperation in structured populations

Wu, Yue; Zhang, Zhipeng; Chang, Shuhua

doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2019.01.006

Cited by 19 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 49 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In our model, we set the value of β range from 0 to 0.5 to investigate the effect of reciprocal rewarding mechanism on the evolution of cooperation in spatial voluntary PDG and voluntary SDG. Compared with reference [60], we obtain entirely different results no matter what value of the additional reciprocal rewarding β is, i.e., cooperation cannot disappear completely even with the larger defection temptation b or cost-to-benefit ratio r since there are risk-averse loners in the spatial structured population. For β = 0, the system returns the traditional voluntary participation game, in which the frequency of cooperation decreases with the increase of temptation b in voluntary PDG or cost-to-benefit ratio r in voluntary SDG.…”

Section: Frequency Of Three Strategiescontrasting

confidence: 72%

“…These results show that the reciprocal rewarding can promote the evolution of cooperation from another aspect, that is, the larger the contribution of the reciprocal rewarding, the more obvious the promoting effect on the evolution of cooperation. In any way, the present model further enriches the reciprocal rewarding mechanism proposed in reference [60].…”

Section: Frequency Of Three Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 65%

“…Based on the above discussions, in this paper, we focus on the effect of reciprocal rewarding on iterated PDG and SDG with voluntary participation on the square lattice network, which is different from the previous work [60]. The results indicate the cooperation level can be drastically enhanced if it is compared with the traditional spatial PDG or SDG model.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 84%

“…When β = 0, the model is reduced to the traditional form, which means that there is no reciprocal rewarding in the system. In our model, considering the additional reward is tiny, we follow the previous work [60]. Here, we assume the value of β ranging from 0 to 0.5 to investigate how the reciprocal rewarding affects the evolution of cooperation in spatial voluntary PDG and voluntary SDG.…”

Section: Evolving Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is found that the self-interaction has a positive role in the evolution of cooperation. While Wu et al [60] further believed that it was not complete to only focus on the cooperative subjects but ignore their opponent's attribute in the rewarding mechanism. In their opinion, the reward must be based on mutual benefit, that is, the additional benefit is the reciprocal rewarding, which showed the model could also greatly promote the evolution of cooperation in the spatial structured population.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Effects of Reciprocal Rewarding on the Evolution of Cooperation in Voluntary Social Dilemmas

Wang

Xia

et al. 2019

Front. Phys.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Voluntary participation, as an effective mechanism to promote cooperation in game theory, has been widely concerned. In the meanwhile, reciprocal rewarding plays an important role in motivating individual initiative. Inspired by this phenomenon, we investigate the effect of reciprocal rewarding on the evolutionary cooperation in spatial social dilemmas, including prisoner's dilemma game and the snowdrift game with voluntary participation. In our model, a cooperative individual fitness will be redefined if one could obtain additional incentive bonus which is proportional to the number of cooperative neighbors. Moreover, each individual is a pure strategist in the spatial structured population and could only choose one of three strategies-cooperation, defection and being a loner. Through numerical simulations, we have confirmed that, compared with the traditional situation, reciprocal rewarding and the payoff of loner can significantly promote the cooperative behavior among the population, and the greater the contribution of reciprocal rewarding/payoff of loner, the more obvious the promoting effect on cooperation. In addition, we also find that there is a condition for loner to make the system fall into the three-strategy cyclic dominance, that is, the payoff of loner can not be too small or too large, which will destroy the situation of cyclic dominance. With regard to these results, it is strongly unveiled that reciprocal rewarding has a positive role to resolve the social dilemmas in the evolution of cooperation.

show abstract

Section: Frequency Of Three Strategiescontrasting

confidence: 72%

Section: Frequency Of Three Strategiesmentioning

confidence: 65%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 84%

Section: Evolving Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations