Reassessing the Case against Evidential Externalism

Abstract

This paper reassesses the case against Evidential Externalism, the thesis that one's evidence fails to supervene on one's non-factive mental states, focusing on two objections to Externalism due by Nicholas Silins: the armchair access argument and the supervenience argument. It also examines Silins's attempt to undermine the force of one major source of motivation for Externalism, namely that the rival Internalist picture of evidence is implicated in some central arguments for scepticism. While Silins concludes that the case against Evidential Externalism is surprisingly strong, reassessing the arguments supports the opposite conclusion; the objections to Externalism are weak, and for all Silins has shown it may well have unmatched advantages when it comes to resisting scepticism.

II—‘This Is the Bad Case’: What Brains in Vats Can Know

“…When Williamson asserts that a subject in the bad case cannot know she is in the bad case, this is what he has in mind. The same is true of the other epistemologists who Magidor quotes echoing Williamson's claim (Silins 2005: 380 andFratantonio andMcGlynn 2018: 87). Magidor also quotes Bernhard Salow, who writes: 'the brain in a vat is presumably in no position to tell that it lacks [the evidence that it has hands]: if it were, it could conclude that it is in a very unusual situation, and the tragedy of the brain's predicament is exactly that it is in no position to figure this out' (forthcoming: 12).…”

Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false

“… See Cohen (1984) for an initial presentation of this idea where the target is reliabilism but the sameness of evidence assumption is operative. SeeSilins (2005) andWedgwood (2002) for more recent discussion that engages with E = K. For attempts to reconcile the intuition that the same attitudes are rational for us with a view on which our evidence differs, seeFratantonio and McGlynn (2018),Ichikawa (2014),Kiesewetter (2017), andLord (2018).…”

Armchair Access and Imagination

“…This paper has rejected the Armchair Access Problem as a genuine problem for E=K. Nevertheless, Littlejohn (2011) and Fratantonio and McGlynn (2018) constitute an exception. According to the first line of response, Silins's formulation of Armchair Access as an existential claim allows for a plausible restriction of Armchair Access to non-environmentally sensitive propositions.…”

“…However, most of the discussion that followed his "Deception and Evidence" focused mainly on his so-called 'Supervenience Argument' and his novel Skeptical Argument. For relevant discussion on these arguments, see Kennedy (2010), Dunn (2012), McGlynn (2014 and Fratantonio and McGlynn (2018). Less attention has been devoted to the Access Problem.…”

“…Less attention has been devoted to the Access Problem. Nevertheless, Littlejohn (2011) and Fratantonio and McGlynn (2018) constitute an exception. Note that my response differs from the one provided by Littlejohn for various reasons.…”