Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false

Abstract

Wordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about our environment. It follows that some evidence is false. Worldly internalism is thought to provide a more satisfying answer to scepticism than classical internalist views that deny that these propositions about our environment might belong to our evidence and to provide a generally more attractive account of rationality and reasons for belief. We argue that worldly internalism faces serious difficulties and that its apparent advantages are illusory. First, it cannot adequately handle some not terribly strange cases of perceptual error. Second, it cannot explain why one should plan to use their evidence to update their beliefs. The second issue allows us to explain why cases of misplaced certainty do not require us to introduce false evidence into our views and that why the alleged advantage of worldly internalism in resisting sceptical pressures is illusory.

Reflection, fallibilism, and doublethink

“…4).12 Here I am assuming what Comesaña (2020) calls Fumerton's Thesis: rational action presupposes rational belief.11 SeeComesaña & McGrath (2016) for an extended defense of these claims. See alsoLittlejohn & Dutant (2021) as one of their lines of criticism that I do not address in this paper takes aim at these claims fromComesaña & McGrath.…”

“…A distinctive feature of Experientialism is that experience can provide false propositions as evidence, whereas, given that knowledge is factive, Factivism entails that only true propositions can be evidence. I want to discuss an objection to Experientialism from Littlejohn & Dutant (2021). They 3 argue that a reflective agent who accepts that evidence could be false is rationally compelled to update their credences differently than unreflective agents, or else they will be guilty of a problematic kind of doublethink: evidence in general can be false, but my evidence is never false.…”

“…The problem for Littlejohn & Dutant, then, is about an agent who comes to believe that it is possible that a proposition P is part of their evidence yet P is false. SeeComesaña (2020a; for clarifications on this subtlety.3 InLittlejohn & Dutant (2021), they present three arguments against Experientialism. The first argues that Experientialism implies that one's evidence could be inconsistent (see also the discussion in Comesaña 2020a, §6.6) and that this is a serious defect of the view.…”