Realism, Liberalism and Non-ideal Theory Or, Are there Two Ways to do Realistic Political Theory?

Sleat, Matt

doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12152

Cited by 89 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 52 publications

(68 reference statements)

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“…On the first response, the distinction is spelled out in terms of the dynamic properties of the interpretative strategy versus the static properties of the traditional account. Here, the practice‐independent method for formulating principles for a specific practice is taken to consist in utilizing an independently justified principle, such as a principle of equality, and then trying to grasp which applied principle this given premise would result in (Sleat : 7; Geuss : 8; Jubb forthcoming: 5). This is then contrasted with the PD method, where no such pre‐given principles are taken into the equation: all principles are developed from the demands of the situation, i.e.…”

Section: Shared Methodological Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practices and Principles: On the Methodological Turn in Political Theory

Erman

Möller

2015

Philosophy Compass

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The question of what role social and political practices should play in the justification of normative principles has received renewed attention in post‐millennium political philosophy. Several current debates express dissatisfaction with the methodology adopted in mainstream political theory, taking the form of a criticism of so‐called ‘ideal theory’ from ‘non‐ideal’ theory, of ‘practice‐independent’ theory from ‘practice‐dependent’ theory, and of ‘political moralism’ from ‘political realism’. While the problem of action‐guidance lies at the heart of these concerns, the critics also share a number of methodological assumptions. Above all, their methodology is practice‐dependent in the sense that an existing (social, political, or institutional) practice is assumed to put substantial limitations on the appropriate normative principles for regulating it. In other words, we cannot formulate and justify an appropriate principle without first understanding the practice (or its point and purpose) this principle is supposed to govern. The aim of this paper is to map out and analyze the common denominators of these debates with regard to methodological commitments. We will investigate how this practice‐dependent method may be understood and motivated. In particular, we point to challenges that must be met in order for the position to remain both distinct and attractive.

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Section: Shared Methodological Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practices and Principles: On the Methodological Turn in Political Theory

Erman

Möller

2015

Philosophy Compass

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“…In this section I focus on what I think is one of the most serious challenges to it, which has emerged from a realist perspective, namely, that ideal theory is founded on the assumption that there is convergence on principles of justice, and that this assumption not only deprives ideal theory of any practical relevance but also betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of the political: disagreement over conceptions of justice is part of the enduring circumstances of politics; 5 insofar as ideal theory assumes convergence on a particular conception, it denies a constitutive feature of the political. 6 I want to avoid getting drawn into an unprofitable discussion of the nature of ideal theory, so I will simply stipulate that the aim of an ideal theory of justice is to…”

Section: Ideal Theory and The Circumstances Of Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Justice, Feasibility, and Ideal Theory: A Pluralist Approach

Mason

2016

Soc Phil Pol

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allowing for a distinction to be made between political philosophy and political theory, these prescriptions seem to me to be unduly constraining. Political theory is a diverse field, accommodating highly abstract inquiries that aim to identify fundamental normative principles by putting to one side facts about our natures and the circumstances in which we live, as well as more grounded forms of reflection that begin by paying close attention to the political problems we face and then seek guidance from the normative principles that are immanent in our practices. In response to attempts to draw limits to what kinds of political theory should be done, or to elevate some forms above others, I shall defend a qualified pluralism that recognizes value in a variety of approaches and resists arguments that purport to show that one particular approach should occupy a privileged position. Against realists, I 2 argue that abstract analyses of political values that bracket a wide range of facts about people and their circumstances can be both coherent and important, whereas I argue against those who think "ideal theory" or the identification of ultimate principles should come first, that the case for always giving it priority is weak. 3 I focus on the notion of justice in particular. 4 I examine three claims that pull in different directions, but any one of which, if it were correct, would alone threaten to place a serious limit on legitimate theorizing about justice. The first is that a socalled "ideal theory of justice" is both useless and misconceived because it is founded on the assumption that citizens agree on principles of justice, thereby depriving it of practical relevance and displaying a misunderstanding of the nature of the political.The second claim is that we cannot justify a principle of justice without taking into account what the effects would be of adopting it in the particular context that it is to govern. And the third one is that we cannot justify conclusions about what justice requires in the circumstances we face, with the constraints they impose on us, unless we know what justice would require in the absence of these constraints. This third claim comes in radical and moderate versions, both of which I shall examine. Neither denies the legitimacy or importance of theorizing about justice that takes into account local facts about what is feasible. But one version maintains that if we are to justify our practical conclusions fully, we have to abstract from all facts about what is feasible in order to identify and then defend the ultimate principles of justice that (it is claimed) must underlie the arguments for these conclusions; the other version maintains that in order to justify these conclusions fully, we need to develop an account of justice that involves putting to one side at least some "soft" constraints that may change over time, while keeping in place "hard" constraints that derive from 3 physical laws, unchangeable facts about the natural environment, or aspects of human nature that are fixe...

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“…Estlund 2008;Sleat 2014;Valentini 2012). In short, it is said to lack real world relevance, or is premiered on unrealistic premises or requirements, and consequently there is a difference between 'ideal' and 'non-ideal' normative political theory.…”

Section: Realism In Political Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, different values and disagreements regarding desirability might also play an important role when determining whether a proposed goal is feasible. The role of such different values and disagreements is often discussed in what is usually called realism in normative political theory, which is dissimilar from the accounts of realism in the distinction between ideal and nonideal theory (Sleat 2014). According to Matt Sleat, realism in this sense has a different notion regarding the purpose and limits of politics and the ambitions of political theory (Sleat 2014: 5).…”

Section: Realism In Political Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Adaptive Ideals and Aspirational Goals: The Utopian Ideals and Realist Constraints of Climate Change Adaptation

Baard

2015

J Agric Environ Ethics

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There is a growing need to implement anticipatory climate change adaptation measures, particularly in vulnerable sectors, such as in agriculture. However, setting goals to adapt is wrought with several challenges. This paper discusses two sets of challenges to goals of anticipatory adaptation, of (1) empirical and (2) normative character. The first set of challenges concern issues such as the extent to which the climate will change, the local impacts of such changes, and available adaptive responses. In the second set of uncertainties are issues such as the distribution of burdens to enhance adaptive capacities in vulnerable agents with a legitimate claim to such resources, and what anticipatory adaptation ideally should result in. While previous discussions have been limited to either discuss the first or second set of uncertainties, this paper suggests that both dimensions should be considered when setting goals in social planning with long time frames. A taxonomy will be suggested that combines both dimensions. Furthermore, strategies for managing situations in which there are either empirical, or normative, uncertainties will be proposed which could be used in social decision-making with long planning time-frames in which goals must be set.

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Realism, Liberalism and Non-ideal Theory Or, Are there Two Ways to do Realistic Political Theory?

Cited by 89 publications

References 52 publications

Practices and Principles: On the Methodological Turn in Political Theory

Practices and Principles: On the Methodological Turn in Political Theory

Justice, Feasibility, and Ideal Theory: A Pluralist Approach

Adaptive Ideals and Aspirational Goals: The Utopian Ideals and Realist Constraints of Climate Change Adaptation

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