Practices and Principles: On the Methodological Turn in Political Theory

Abstract

The question of what role social and political practices should play in the justification of normative principles has received renewed attention in post‐millennium political philosophy. Several current debates express dissatisfaction with the methodology adopted in mainstream political theory, taking the form of a criticism of so‐called ‘ideal theory’ from ‘non‐ideal’ theory, of ‘practice‐independent’ theory from ‘practice‐dependent’ theory, and of ‘political moralism’ from ‘political realism’. While the problem of action‐guidance lies at the heart of these concerns, the critics also share a number of methodological assumptions. Above all, their methodology is practice‐dependent in the sense that an existing (social, political, or institutional) practice is assumed to put substantial limitations on the appropriate normative principles for regulating it. In other words, we cannot formulate and justify an appropriate principle without first understanding the practice (or its point and purpose) this principle is supposed to govern. The aim of this paper is to map out and analyze the common denominators of these debates with regard to methodological commitments. We will investigate how this practice‐dependent method may be understood and motivated. In particular, we point to challenges that must be met in order for the position to remain both distinct and attractive.

A Framework for Critical-Empiricist Research in Political Communication

“…Ultimately, empirical validation makes normative theory more realistic, but not in the sense of letting established practices put excessive limitations on the appropriate normative principles for regulating them (Erman & Möller, 2015). Instead, researchers should take as their starting point a normative theory, parse it for empirical assumptions, and then develop research designs to test them so as to contribute to incremental improvements of the normative forumation.…”

Being Realistic and Demanding the Impossible

“…2 For a lively debate on this issue see Jubb and Rossi (2015) versus Erman and Möller (2015b), and Leader-Maynard and Worsnip (2018) versus Jubb (2019). I will not take issue on the technicalities of this sometimes semantics-dominated debate, but I will attempt to bypass it by showing how realists can make normative claims without relying on pre-political moral commitments.…”

Being realistic and demanding the impossible

“…For a lively debate on this issue see Jubb and Rossi () versus Erman and Möller (), and Leader‐Maynard and Worsnip () versus Jubb (). I will not take issue on the technicalities of this sometimes semantics‐dominated debate, but I will attempt to bypass it by showing how realists can make normative claims without relying on pre‐political moral commitments.…”

“…For an overview seeJubb (2017),McQueen (2017), andRossi and Sleat (2014).2 For a lively debate on this issue seeJubb and Rossi (2015) versusErman and Möller (2015b), and Leader-Maynard and Worsnip (2018) versus Jubb (2019). I will not take issue on the technicalities of this sometimes semantics-dominated debate, but I will attempt to bypass it by showing how realists can make normative claims without relying on pre-political moral commitments.3 "Political association" need not refer to the modern state(Raekstad, 2016).4 Notice, however, how the broader radical realist approach I describe here need not be genealogical: one may draw on epistemic normativity simply by pointing out that things aren't as they seem, regardless of their genealogy.…”