According to what has recently been labeled ‘political realism’ in political theory, ‘political moralists’ such as Rawls and Dworkin misconstrue the political domain by presuming that morality has priority over politics, thus overlooking that the political is an autonomous domain with its own distinctive conditions and normative sources. Political realists argue that this presumption, commonly referred to as the ‘ethics first premise’, has to be abandoned in order to properly theorize a normative conception of political legitimacy. This article critically examines two features of political realism, which so far have received too little systematic philosophical analysis: the political realist critique of political moralism and the challenges facing political realism in its attempt to offer an alternative account of political legitimacy. Two theses are defended. First, to the extent that proponents of political realism wish to hold onto a normative conception of political legitimacy, refuting wholesale the ethics first premise leads to a deadlock, since it throws the baby out with the bathwater by closing the normative space upon which their account of political legitimacy relies. This is called the ‘necessity thesis’: all coherent and plausible conceptions of political legitimacy must hold onto the ethics first premise. Secondly, accepting this premise – and thus defending an ethics first view – does not entail that the political domain must be seen as a subordinate arena for the application of moral principles, that political normativity is reduced to morality or that morality trumps other reasons in political decision making, as claimed by political realists. Rather, the ethics first view is compatible with an autonomous political domain that makes room for an account of political legitimacy that is defined by and substantiated from sources of normativity specifically within the political. This is called the ‘compatibility thesis’.

Democracy presumes a collective, a group of individuals, who are in a specific sense self-governing or selfdetermining. The problem of who should be included in this collective and thus take part in the collective democratic decision-making, what is sometimes called the boundary problem in democratic theory, is an increasingly pressing political problem in light of growing asymmetries between rule-makers and rule-takers in a globalized world. Even though Robert Dahl was correct to note that virtually none of the great political philosophers of the Western canon paid much attention to the boundary problem, the same cannot be said about today's debate. For democratic theorists and political philosophers, this problem is presently one of the more debated questions in political theory. While the boundary problem can (and has) been approached in a variety of ways pleading to moral theory, through which democracy is justified instrumentally for realizing some other normative ideal, e.g. justice, the present paper is a contribution to this debate with the intent to hold on to the ideal of democracy -that is, where democracy as collective self-determination (the 'rule by the people') is intrinsically justified 1 as the ultimate foundation of legitimate authority. 2 It is sometimes claimed that we cannot approach the boundary problem from within democratic theory, as it were, since such an ideal must presuppose a 'demos' in order to execute 'kratos'. At the same time, it would be quite disturbing if normative democratic theory could not offer any guidance whatsoever in this matter. Broadly speaking, we can discern two different approaches to this problem in democratic theory. On the narrower exogenous view, the boundary problem is considered to be a question to which democratic theory is not supposed to offer an answer. In other words, it is seen as external to democratic theory. Starting out from already existing borders, the basic question is rather which conditions must be fulfilled in order for an arrangement to qualify as democratic. On the broader endogenous view, by contrast, the boundary question is seen as internal to democratic theory in the sense that answers to this question also rest on democratic theory. 3 While there seems to be no reason to demand that democratic theory must always answer the boundary question in order to do some proper normative work, philosophers and political theorists interested in the boundary problem tend to agree on the broader view.A basic presumption of this paper is that to the extent that we wish to hold on to democracy as a normative ideal when approaching the boundary question about justified inclusion (henceforth the 'B question' for simplicity), whatever solution we come up with, it must be compatible with the basic conditions of democracy (answering what is henceforth called the 'C question', i.e. what conditions must an arrangement fulfill in order to be democratic?). That is to say, since there are many possible boundary questions to be asked in normative space, concern...

Despite the broad consensus on the value of political legitimacy in global politics, there is still little agreement on what the specific regulative content of the principles of legitimacy ought to be. Two main paths have thus far been taken in the theoretical literature to respond to the legitimacy deficit in the global domain: one via the ideal of democracy, another via the ideal of justice. However, both have run into problems. The overall purpose of this paper is to examine these two paths in the endeavour to explore the possibilities of a third path, which investigates global political legitimacy (GPL) as a value that is at a basic level distinct from democracy and justice. The paper aims to fulfil two tasks. The conceptual task consists in identifying some characteristics of the concept of GPL that makes it distinct from political legitimacy generally, as well as showing its usefulness for normative theorizing. The normative task is twofold: first, to demonstrate that the value of GPL is reducible neither to democracy nor to justice; and second, to develop the contours of a dual account of GPL, in which both justice and democracy play essential roles.

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In recent years, we have witnessed deliberative democracy take a ‘civil society turn’ to address the democratic deficit of global governance. In light of the present circumstances of world politics, it is argued that civil society offers a rich soil for reformulating democracy globally. This article engages in this debate with particular focus on democratic agency. It investigates the notion of democratic agency built into this deliberative civil society view with regard to its democratic qualities. This is done by problematizing a common feature underlying this view, here called the ‘separability premise’, which presumes that it is possible to define democracy as two or more separate core democratic qualities or mechanisms — most importantly, inclusive participation, accountability, authorization and deliberation — and that democracy increases the more one or more of these are strengthened. The article defends the thesis that the proposed political subject is not equipped to be a democratic agent insofar as the deliberative civil society view does not fulfil two basic requirements for an arrangement to qualify as minimally democratic, namely, political equality and political bindingness. The article concludes that insofar as we wish to hold on to a deliberative conception of democracy, something along the lines of Habermas’s two-track view is still our best bet for accommodating these two conditions, even in a transnational context, since it is able to avoid the problems connected with the separability premise.

Recognition plays a multifaceted role in international theory. In rarely communicating literatures, the term is invoked to explain creation of new states and international structures; policy choices by state and non-state actors; and normative justifiability, or lack thereof, of foreign and international politics. The purpose of this symposium is to open new possibilities for imagining and studying recognition in international politics by drawing together different strands of research in this area. More specifically, the forum brings new attention to controversies on the creation of states, which has traditionally been a preserve for discussion in International Law, by invoking social theories of recognition that have developed as part of International Relations more recently. It is suggested that broadening imagination across legal and social approaches to recognition provides the resources needed for theories with this object to be of maximal relevance to political practice.

During the last couple of decades, concurrently with an increased awareness of the complexity of ethical conflicts, political theorists have directed attention to how constitutional democracy should cope with a fact of incommensurable doctrines. Poststructuralists such as Chantal Mouffe claim that ethical conflicts are fundamentally irreconcilable, which is indeed a view shared by many liberal theorists. The question of whether ethical conflicts are in principle irreconcilable is an important one since the answer has implications for what democratic institutions are desirable. In light of this question the article investigates the notion of conflict in agonistic pluralism and discourse theory. At first glance, Mouffe's agonism seems apt to accommodate ethical conflict in democratic governance, since it focuses on conflict as the core of politics, whereas Habermasian deliberative democracy seems inappropriate for this task, as it focuses on consensus. However, through an inquiry into the conditions of conflict this article will argue the opposite, namely, that conflict cannot be adequately understood within Mouffe's agonistic framework. The thesis defended is (1) that discourse theory offers a more accurate account of conflict than agonistic theory because it embraces the idea that deliberation is constitutive of conflict, and (2) that some of Habermas' assumptions concerning ethical discourse need to be revised in order for his democratic theory to fully accommodate this insight.

Although the discussion about feasibility in political theory is still in its infancy, some important progress has been made in the last years to advance our understanding. In this paper, we intend to make a contribution to this growing literature by investigating the proper place of feasibility considerations in political theory. A motivating force behind this study is a suspicion that many presumptions made about feasibility in several current debates-such as that between practice-independence and practice-dependence, ideal and non-ideal theory, and political moralism and political realism-are too rigid and underestimate the numerous different ways in which feasibility concerns may enter into our theorizing. To chisel out this feasibility space, our aim is to suggest two metatheoretical constraints on normative political principles as intuitively plausible, the so-called 'fitness constraint' and the 'functional constraint', through which we elucidate five central aspects for determining proper feasibility constraints of an account in political theory.