Realism in Normative Political Theory

Abstract

This paper provides a critical overview of the realist current in contemporary political philosophy. We define political realism on the basis of its attempt to give varying degrees of autonomy to politics as a sphere of human activity, in large part through its exploration of the sources of normativity appropriate for the political, and so distinguish sharply between political realism and non-ideal theory. We then identify and discuss four key arguments advanced by political realists: from ideology, from the relationship of ethics to politics, from the priority of legitimacy over justice, and from the nature of political judgment. Next, we ask to what extent realism is a methodological approach as opposed to a substantive political position, and so discuss the relationship between realism and a few such positions. We close by pointing out the links between contemporary realism and the realist strand that runs through much of the history of Western political thought.Much contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy operates as a branch of applied ethics: normative political theory is supposed to implement moral commitments external to politics, be they teleological ideals or deontological constraints. However in recent years-under the loose label of 'political realism'-an alternative approach has emerged, or perhaps reemerged (Galston 2010; Runciman 2012). Crudely, realists maintain that political philosophy should not seek to regiment politics through morality; rather, it should theorise about the distinctive forces that shape real politics. Critics of realism see this move as a capitulation of normative theory in favour of descriptive approaches to politics. Realists see it as a way to make political philosophy more relevant and less ideological.This article has two main objectives and as many main sections. First, we propose a working definition of realism, and a critical overview of what we take to be the four key arguments in favour of that position. Second, we explore the status of realist theory: is it best characterised as a series of methodological concerns or does it represent a substantive political position it is own right? In the brief conclusion we discuss to what extent realism is (or could be) a new development rather than a revival of a traditional current of political thinking.

Practices and Principles: On the Methodological Turn in Political Theory

“…Cohen 2003Cohen , 2008Caney 2005) neglect that the socio-political practice to which a principle of justice is supposed to apply fundamentally affects the content and justification of that principle (Sangiovanni 2008(Sangiovanni , 2011Ronzoni 2009Ronzoni , 2011James 2005James , 2012Rossi 2012). A third debate has emerged in democratic theory, where political realists accuse political moralistsincluding all of the above philosophersof putting too much faith in abstract and general moral principles for justifying principles of political legitimacy, arguing instead that we must start out from the reality of 'dirty politics' and regard principles of legitimacy as distinctly political with little or no grounding in moral values (Rossi and Sleat 2014;Geuss 2008;Bellamy 2010;Williams 2005;Newey 2010;Galston 2010;Rossi 2012;Sleat 2010;Horton 2010;Mouffe 2005).…”

“…In a similar fashion, political realists urge us to start in the reality of politics and the context in which practices of political agency take place. Proper principles of political legitimacy should be theorized from within the actual workings of politics rather than from some abstract 'external' moral standpoint (Rossi and Sleat 2014;Bellamy 2010;Geuss 2008;Philp 2010).…”

“…And reaching such an understanding requires that the theorist engages in thoroughgoing interpretation (Valentini 2011: 404;Sangiovanni 2008;Mills 2005). It is argued that this methodological stance is superior to the methodologies adopted by mainstream political philosophy for identifying and justifying general political principles such as those of justice or political legitimacy (Mills 2005: 172; Jubb forthcoming: 2; Banai et al 2011;Rossi and Sleat 2014).…”

“…The open interpretation of the PD method has intuitive appeal, but it introduces a severe challenge for the theorist who insists that the method offers something distinct, something traditional political theorists deny or cannot account for (Sangiovanni 2008;Jubb forthcoming;Banai et al 2011;Rossi and Sleat 2014;Mills 2005). The challenge comes in the familiar form of the method of ref lective equilibrium (RE) (Rawls 1971).…”

Political realism and international relations

“…Realism has played a far less pivotal role in political theory. It is only in the last decade or so that a self-conscious realist position has begun to emerge in the field, though it draws on various long-standing lines of thought (for surveys, see Bell, 2008a;Galston, 2010;Rossi & Sleat, 2014;Sleat, 2013;Sleat, 2017a). The recent burst of writing has been inspired above all by the work of B. and Raymond Geuss (2001Geuss ( , 2008, although numerous other thinkers have also been recruited to the cause, sometimes retrospectively.…”