Reactions to Outgroup Authorities' Decisions: The Role of Expected Bias, Procedural Fairness and Outcome Favorability

Abstract

It is argued here that expectations of bias (vs. no bias) play a key role in explaining reactions to decisions made by outgroup authorities. Two experiments demonstrate that decision acceptance (Experiment 1) and intentions to protest against an outgroup authority's decisions (Experiment 2) are affected by procedural fairness when the authority has a reputation of being unbiased, but not when the authority's reputation suggests bias. By contrast, some evidence is also found suggesting that reactions to an outgroup authority's decisions are affected by the favorability of the outcome when the authority has a reputation of being biased, but not when the authority has a reputation of being unbiased. Mediation analyses indicate that two different processes account for these effects.

Post‐decision consolidation in large group decision‐making

“…We did not find such moderating effects of the decision maker’s group status on decision satisfaction. However, such effects are typically found in situations where the decision‐makers are themselves members of a sub‐group in the larger group for whom the decision is made, and hence can be expected to be biased in favor of their own in‐group members (Ståhl et al ., 2008). We believe that a reasonable explanation to our lack of effect is that this study did not include any established sub‐group of participants that were in‐group members to the teachers.…”

“…For example, research suggests that people may become more concerned with outcome favorability when decisions are made by out‐group, as compared to in‐group authorities (Duck & Fielding, 2003; Huo, Smith, Tyler & Lind, 1996; Ståhl, van Prooijen & Vermunt, 2004). This tendency is particularly evident in situations where out‐group authorities are expected to be biased in favor of their own in‐group members (Ståhl, Vermunt & Ellemers, 2008). However, research also demonstrates that people often become more involved and react more strongly to the fairness of the procedure if the decision‐maker belongs to their own group as compared to an out‐group (Huo, 2003; Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz & Lind, 1998; van Knippenberg et al , 2007).…”

Two experimental tests of relational models of procedural justice: Non‐instrumental voice and authority group membership

“…The absence of instrumentality may be seen simply as no voice at all when speaking to an out-group authority, an effect likely to derive from a failure to trust out-group authorities to pursue one's own best interests (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009). Indeed, Ståhl et al (2008b) showed that explicitly informing group members of an out-group authority's non-biased (i.e., more trustworthy) reputation led participants to respond more favourably to voice denial, even in the presence of a negative outcome.…”

“…To be sure, other researchers have experimentally contrasted instrumental voice with a form of non‐instrumental voice. The work of Ståhl, Vermunt, and Ellemers (2008b) is particularly relevant here. In their studies, the effects pertinent to our current argument would have manifest themselves in an interaction between voice provision versus voice denial on the one hand, and the favourable versus unfavourable outcome received on the other hand; in this paradigm, non‐instrumental voice would be conceptualized as voice provision with an unfavourable outcome.…”

“…The reversal under an out‐group authority may obtain if group members respond particularly cynically to the non‐instrumental voice (cf. Smith et al , 1998; Ståhl et al , 2008b). In Experiment 2, we expanded our analysis to examine participants’ strivings to reclaim voice following its denial or non‐instrumental provision; we describe the rationale in more detail in the introduction to that experiment.…”