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In the present article we demonstrate stable individual differences in the extent to which a reliance on logic and evidence in the formation and evaluation of beliefs is perceived as a moral virtue, and a reliance on less rational processes is perceived as a vice. We refer to this individual difference variable as moralized rationality. Eight studies are reported in which an instrument to measure individual differences in moralized rationality is validated. Results show that the Moralized Rationality Scale (MRS) is internally consistent, and captures something distinct from the personal importance people attach to being rational (Studies 1–3). Furthermore, the MRS has high test-retest reliability (Study 4), is conceptually distinct from frequently used measures of individual differences in moral values, and it is negatively related to common beliefs that are not supported by scientific evidence (Study 5). We further demonstrate that the MRS predicts morally laden reactions, such as a desire for punishment, of people who rely on irrational (vs. rational) ways of forming and evaluating beliefs (Studies 6 and 7). Finally, we show that the MRS uniquely predicts motivation to contribute to a charity that works to prevent the spread of irrational beliefs (Study 8). We conclude that (1) there are stable individual differences in the extent to which people moralize a reliance on rationality in the formation and evaluation of beliefs, (2) that these individual differences do not reduce to the personal importance attached to rationality, and (3) that individual differences in moralized rationality have important motivational and interpersonal consequences.

In two studies, we investigate the effect of individuals' promotion and prevention focus on engagement in collective action. We show that responding to group-based disadvantage out of a sense of moral conviction motivates prevention-oriented- but not promotion-oriented- individuals to engage in collective action. Furthermore, holding such strong moral convictions about the fair treatment of their group causes the prevention-oriented to disregard societal rules against hostile forms of collective action (i.e., forms of action that are aimed at harming the interests of those held responsible for the group's disadvantage). Study 1 showed that prevention-oriented individuals, but not promotion-oriented individuals, with a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of their group are willing to support both hostile and benevolent forms of collective action. Study 2 replicated this effect and showed that for prevention-oriented individuals but not for promotion-oriented individuals, holding a strong moral conviction about the fair treatment of the group overrides moral objections to hostile forms of collective action in the decision to support these forms of action.

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Previous research has demonstrated that stereotype threat induces a prevention focus and impairs central executive functions. The present research examines how these 2 consequences of stereotype threat are related. The authors argue that the prevention focus is responsible for the effects of stereotype threat on executive functions and cognitive performance. However, because the prevention focus is adapted to deal with threatening situations, the authors propose that it also leads to some beneficial responses to stereotype threat. Specifically, because stereotype threat signals a high risk of failure, a prevention focus initiates immediate recruitment of cognitive control resources. The authors further argue that this response initially facilitates cognitive performance but that the additional cognitive demands associated with working under threat lead to cognitive depletion over time. Study 1 demonstrates that stereotype threat (vs. control) facilitates immediate cognitive control capacity during a stereotype-relevant task. Study 2 experimentally demonstrates the process by showing that stereotype threat (vs. control) facilitates cognitive control as a default, as well as when a prevention focus has been experimentally induced, but not when a promotion focus has been induced. Study 3 shows that stereotype threat facilitates initial math performance under a prevention focus, whereas no effect is found under a promotion focus. Consistent with previous research, however, stereotype threat impaired math performance over time under a prevention focus, but not under a promotion focus.

Theorizing on procedural justice has assumed that people's reactions to outgroup authorities are to a large extent based on instrumental concerns. Therefore, attention is primarily directed to outcomes rather than procedures in encounters with outgroup authorities. In the current article we propose that in order for people dealing with outgroup authorities to be strongly affected by procedural fairness, the available outcome information should be ambiguous. Furthermore, we argue that people confronted with an outgroup authority react particularly negatively to unfair procedures that give them negative outcome expectancies. These patterns are not expected in encounters with ingroup authorities. Two experiments support our line of reasoning. The discussion focuses on the implications of these findings for the integration of theoretical perspectives on procedural justice.

Previous research suggests that unfounded beliefs (UB)-such as conspiracist beliefs and beliefs in the supernatural-stem from similar cognitive and motivational mechanisms. More specifically, it has been demonstrated that cognitive ability is negatively associated with UB but only among individuals who value epistemic rationality. The present study goes beyond previous correlational studies by examining whether the negative association between cognitive ability and UB can be strengthened through a subtle rationality prime. In a large scale online experiment (N = 762 French teachers), we demonstrate that priming rationality (vs. control) does enhance the negative relationship between cognitive ability and adherence to supernatural beliefs, as well as conspiracy mentality (d = 0.2). This effect was not obtained for illusory pattern perception. This study's usefulness as a "proof of concept" for future interventions aimed at reducing UB prevalence among the general public is discussed.

This research examined reactions towards female rape victims from a system justification perspective. Study 1 demonstrated that gender-related system justification motivation (Modern Sexism) predicted the propensity to blame a female rape victim among men, but not among women. Modern sexism predicted rape victim blaming among men even when statistically controlling for a general antipathy towards women, and the results were unaffected by social desirability concerns. Consistent with previous study on system justification theory, we demonstrated in Study 2 that system justification motivation can predict victim blaming also among women, provided that complementary stereotypes about women have been activated. By contrast, system justification motivation predicted men's propensity to blame a rape victim irrespective of whether complementary stereotypes about women had been experimentally activated.