On the basis of fairness heuristic theory, the authors provide an explanation of the frequently replicated fair process effect (the finding that perceived procedural fairness positively affects how people react to outcomes). The authors argue that, in many situations, people may find it difficult to assess whether their outcome is fair or unfair and satisfying or unsatisfying because they only have information about their own outcome and they do not know the outcomes of others and that, in these situations, people use the fairness of the procedure as a heuristic substitute to assess how to judge their outcome. The results of 2 experiments corroborate the authors' line of reasoning. Findings are discussed in terms of recent developments toward an integration of the procedural and distributive justice domains.

In this article, 2 experiments are presented. In both experiments, the independent variables were whether the procedure was accurate or inaccurate, whether the outcome was favorable or unfavorable, and whether participants were informed about the procedure before or after they were informed about the outcome. The independent variables were manipulated by means of scenarios in Experiment 1 and by means of the R. \fermunt, A. P. Wit, K. van den Bos, and E. A. Lind (1996) paradigm in Experiment 2. As predicted on the basis of the authors' analysis of fairness heuristic theory, the findings revealed that what people judge to be fair is more strongly affected by information that is received first than by subsequently received information. The findings are discussed in terms of recent developments toward an integration of the procedural and distributive justice domains.

The authors refine and extend their explanation of the psychology of the fair process effect (the positive influence of procedural fairness on outcome evaluations). On the basis of fairness heuristic theory's substitutability proposition, the authors predicted and found that outcome evaluations show strong effects of procedural fairness when outcomes are better or worse than expected, whereas less strong fair process effects appear when outcomes are equal to or differ from the outcome of a comparison other. This finding suggests some important differences in how people use expectations versus social comparisons as reference points for evaluating outcomes. Findings also revealed that fairness judgments do not always show the same effects as do satisfaction judgments, indicating differences in the way people form judgments on these two dimensions of outcome evaluation.How do people judge the outcomes they receive? A central tenet in the growing literature about judgment and choice (e.g.,

The authors investigate the effect of power differences and associated expectations in social decision making. Using a modified ultimatum game, the authors show that allocators lower their offers to recipients when the power difference shifts in favor of the allocator. Remarkably, however, when recipients are completely powerless, offers increase. This effect is mediated by a change in framing of the situation: When the opponent is without power, feelings of social responsibility are evoked. On the recipient side, the authors show that recipients do not anticipate these higher outcomes resulting from powerlessness. They prefer more power over less, expecting higher outcomes when they are more powerful, especially when less power entails powerlessness. Results are discussed in relation to empathy gaps and social responsibility.

We argue that people's self-esteem is afSected by the fairness of procedures to which they are subjected; unfair treatment will lower self-esteem. Moreover