This study explores the existing relations between types of federalism and the control over the acquisition of land by foreigners. The objective is to identify the locus of power in the state machinery as well as possible sources of interference in this control. To this end, the State is analyzed from a perspective of being a bureaucracy, with a focus on the study of the American and Brazilian institutional arrangements for controlling acquisition of land by foreigners. The research emphasizes political debates regarding regulatory policy making in Brazil and the USA, underlining the centrality of power within the federal sphere, especially regarding national security. The analysis seeks to contribute to the debate on layer cake federalism in the Americas insofar as it indicates an exclusivity of the federal sphere in the management of the regulatory system. It also points to the non-cooperation or absence of partnerships between federal entities involved in this area of government activity. The research explores the background of land negotiations, given that the federal bureaucratic apparatus is not sufficient for guaranteeing State control over the acquisition of land by foreigners given the practical skills and know-how of individuals dealing with the legal exigencies in a political context of an open-door to foreign investment in land. The limitations of the federal bureaucratic machinery are examined, in both countries, regarding its ability to discover the real land owner when a given property pertains to a domestic company under the command of a foreign interest. The conclusion is that the layer cake type of federalism does not allow State control over the acquisition of land by foreigners as their skills or jeito and know-how are instruments that make possible the bypassing of the law. In this sense, such skills amount to a -work around‖ of the State itself, given the velocity of land negotiations within the context of an open-door land acquisition policy.