Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism

Siscoe, Robert Weston

doi:10.1007/s11098-021-01671-8

Cited by 7 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 55 publications

(51 reference statements)

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“…14 Though see Matheson & Milam (2021) for an argument against the existence of non-moral blame. 15 See Li (2019) and Siscoe (2022) for a discussion of whether epistemic supererogation can provide support for epistemic permissivism, the view that there can be more than one rationally permissible belief which one may hold in relation to some body of evidence. 16 Those unconvinced by this example may consider the following example suggested by Nado (2019): "[S]uppose that I check ten separate sources before resting content with my belief that Mogadishu is the capital of Somalia.…”

Section: Epistemic Supererogationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What’s the Use of Non-moral Supererogation?

Archer

2023

Handbook of Supererogation

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While moral philosophers have paid significant attention to the concept of moral supererogation, far less attention has been paid to the possibility that supererogation may also exist in other areas of normativity. Recently, though, philosophers have begun to consider the possible existence of prudential, epistemic, aesthetic and sporting supererogation. These discussions tend to focus on aspects of our practices in these areas of normativity that suggest an implicit acceptance of the existence of supererogation. In this chapter, I will offer a different kind of defense of non-moral supererogation. I will begin by considering a particular kind of argument made in support of moral supererogation. According to this line of argument, we should accept the existence of moral supererogation because a moral code which makes room for supererogation is likely to be more effective at promoting morally desirable behavior than a moral code which leaves no room for the supererogatory. I will begin by outlining this argument. I will then develop a similar line of argument for prudential, epistemic, aesthetic, and sporting norms.

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Section: Epistemic Supererogationmentioning

confidence: 99%

What’s the Use of Non-moral Supererogation?

Archer

2023

Handbook of Supererogation

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“…For a similar argument (about epistemic rationality, not fittingness) seeSiscoe (2022).15 This exposition elides the distinction between partial absolute gradable adjectives like "wet," which are associated with scales with minimal endpoints, and total absolute gradable adjectives like "empty," which are associated with scales with maximal endpoints. If "fitting" is an absolute gradable adjective, it is of the latter variety.16 It's worth noting that Berker and Maguire seem to agree that the natural-language term 'fitting' is gradable; Maguire simply insists that the property of fittingness is non-gradable.…”

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“…If "fitting" is an absolute gradable adjective, it is of the latter variety.16 It's worth noting that Berker and Maguire seem to agree that the natural-language term 'fitting' is gradable; Maguire simply insists that the property of fittingness is non-gradable. 17Burnett (2017: 70-2) defends this model at length; for philosophical work friendly to this model, seeHawthorne and Logins (2021),Siscoe (2022), andUnger (1979, ch. 2).…”

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Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like

Fritz

2023

Philos Stud

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Sometimes, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems like a demand to have that attitude. But in other cases, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems more like a permission to have the attitude. I defend a proposal that can accommodate both of these appearances. I argue that there is a kind of emotionlessness, which I call apathy, that can be fitting or unfitting in just the same way that emotion can. I further argue that, in some cases, it can be fitting to respond a single object either with emotion or with apathy. When both apathy and emotion are fitting options, the fittingness of the emotion is a permission-like status; failures to have the fitting emotion are not failures of fit. But when an emotion is fitting and apathy is unfitting, the fittingness of the emotion is a demand-like status; failures to have the emotion are failures of fit.We can evaluate attitudes against many different standards. Take, for example, the enjoyment I feel while watching the movie Point Break. There are a variety of questions that I could ask about that enjoyment. Is it morally vicious for me to enjoy Point Break? Is it healthy for me to do so? Is it the best response, all things considered, that I could have to the movie? Each of these questions measures my enjoyment against a different standard for success.Many hold that we can also measure my enjoyment of Point Break against a further standard: we can ask whether that enjoyment is fitting. Whether we can give an informative, non-circular definition of fittingness is a matter of controversy. But fittingness is a familiar property: it's fitting to feel shame when you've done something shameful, to admire people who are admirable, to be disgusted by meals that are disgusting, and to enjoy action movies that are enjoyable. To say that an attitude is fitting is to say that the attitude matches its object in a certain way. 1

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Supererogation

Cureton¹,

Hill²

2023

The International Encyclopedia of Ethics

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“Supererogation” is now a technical term in philosophy for a range of ideas expressed by terms such as “good but not required,” “beyond the call of duty,” “praiseworthy but not obligatory,” and “good to do but not bad not to do.” Examples often cited are extremely generous acts of charity, heroic self‐sacrifice, extraordinary service to morally worthy causes, and sometimes forgiveness and minor favors. Moral philosophers have generally focused on whether or not some of these terms refer to a fundamental moral category and, if so, how the category should be defined, which acts the category includes, and whether various moral theories adequately acknowledge it. This entry traces some of the historical roots of the idea of supererogation, discusses whether utilitarian, Kantian, and other moral theories can incorporate acts that are good to do but not required, and examines whether theories that do so are objectionably imperialistic and demanding. After exploring some contemporary controversies that concern supererogation and noting some important distinctions, the entry ends with a discussion of supererogatory virtue in which someone attains a level of virtue beyond what duty requires.

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Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism

Cited by 7 publications

References 55 publications

What’s the Use of Non-moral Supererogation?

What’s the Use of Non-moral Supererogation?

Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like

Supererogation

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