Why fittingness is only sometimes demand-like

Abstract

Sometimes, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems like a demand to have that attitude. But in other cases, the fact that an attitude is fitting seems more like a permission to have the attitude. I defend a proposal that can accommodate both of these appearances. I argue that there is a kind of emotionlessness, which I call apathy, that can be fitting or unfitting in just the same way that emotion can. I further argue that, in some cases, it can be fitting to respond a single object either with emotion or with apathy. When both apathy and emotion are fitting options, the fittingness of the emotion is a permission-like status; failures to have the fitting emotion are not failures of fit. But when an emotion is fitting and apathy is unfitting, the fittingness of the emotion is a demand-like status; failures to have the emotion are failures of fit.We can evaluate attitudes against many different standards. Take, for example, the enjoyment I feel while watching the movie Point Break. There are a variety of questions that I could ask about that enjoyment. Is it morally vicious for me to enjoy Point Break? Is it healthy for me to do so? Is it the best response, all things considered, that I could have to the movie? Each of these questions measures my enjoyment against a different standard for success.Many hold that we can also measure my enjoyment of Point Break against a further standard: we can ask whether that enjoyment is fitting. Whether we can give an informative, non-circular definition of fittingness is a matter of controversy. But fittingness is a familiar property: it's fitting to feel shame when you've done something shameful, to admire people who are admirable, to be disgusted by meals that are disgusting, and to enjoy action movies that are enjoyable. To say that an attitude is fitting is to say that the attitude matches its object in a certain way. 1