Quality Disclosure Programs and Internal Organizational Practices: Evidence from Airline Flight Delays

Forbes, Silke J.; Lederman, Mara; Tombe, Trevor

doi:10.1257/mic.20130164

Cited by 40 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In the article by Zámková, Prokop (2015a) it was proved that the delays caused by the air traffic control at Czech airports are more frequent at night and during the evening, whereas it has now been found that at European airports this reason is more prevalent in the morning. According to Forbes, Lederman, Tombe (2015) airlines should release information about the number of flights delayed by longer than 15 minutes. In our opinion it would be very useful if all airlines reported these data publicly.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Factors Influencing Flight Delays of a European Airline

Zámková¹,

Prokop²,

Stolín³

2017

Acta Univ. Agric. Silvic. Mendelianae Brun.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The main aim of the paper was to investigate factors influencing flight delays of a European airline. Besides the identification and analysis of those factors the paper offers possible suggestions on how to eliminate the delays. The research is based on data acquired over the period of time spanning from June to September in 2008 -2014. Analysis of contingency tables, including Pearson's chi-squared test, has been used for data processing. The dependencies have been presented in graphical form by using correspondence maps. The proportion of delayed flights reaches approx. 50 % during nearly the entire monitored period only in September the proportion drops to 45 %. Flight delays are most frequently caused by delays of previous flights of the same plane. These previous delayed flights are the main culprit of long delays and the frequency of delay occurrence caused by this reason increases significantly during the day. Longer delays of flights appear also due to technical maintenance or aircraft defects. On the contrary other factors such as operational control and crew duty norms, air traffic control and airport limitations tend to cause rather shorter delays of flights with the air traffic control encountering more problems with coordination of flights in the early morning. The supply and service companies also manage to eliminate long delays.

show abstract

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Factors Influencing Flight Delays of a European Airline

Zámková¹,

Prokop²,

Stolín³

2017

Acta Univ. Agric. Silvic. Mendelianae Brun.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Forbes et al (2012) find that airline personnel who are rewarded for on-time performance reduce taxi-in times only when the expected arrival time is just around the critical threshold for the flight being recorded as 'late'. Schweitzer et al (2004) and Cadsby et al (2010) find in lab experiments that non-linear incentive schemes invite substantial lying to meet the target.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…Possibly, we do not have a sufficiently large number of observations to identify region-specific week fixed effects as well as the effect of intermediate relative performance split out by week. 24 Next, to assess the exogeneity of our instrument we conducted a placebo-experiment. In particular, we pretend that our experiment would have taken place in weeks 1-4 instead of weeks 5-8 of 2010, following similar estimation procedures as above.…”

Section: Robustness Checksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay: A field experiment

Delfgaauw¹,

Dur²,

Non³

et al. 2014

Labour Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe conduct a field experiment among 189 stores of a retail chain to study dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay. Employees in the randomly selected treatment stores could win a bonus by outperforming three comparable stores from the control group over the course of four weeks. Treatment stores received weekly feedback on relative performance. Control stores were kept unaware of their involvement, so that their performance generates exogenous variation in the relative performance of the treatment stores. As predicted by theory, we find that treatment stores that lag far behind do not respond to the incentives, while the responsiveness of treatment stores close to winning a bonus increases in relative performance. On average, the introduction of the relative performance pay scheme does not lead to higher performance. JEL-Codes: C93, M52.

show abstract

“…In the cases documented by Jacob and Levitt (2003), Figlio and Getzler (2006), and Forbes et al (2015), producers were able to practice manipulation independently. When disclosed information is collected by inspection, manipulation likely requires the inspector's involvement.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While this need for complicity creates an initial hurdle to manipulation, corruption could be quite pervasive if that hurdle is cleared. After all, it is the inspectors who 4 Notably, Forbes et al (2015) assess mandatory disclosure by US airlines of the fraction of their flights which are more than 15 minutes late. They find that some airlines respond strongly, shifting attention toward flights expected to be around 15 minutes late, and some do not respond at all.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mandatory disclosure, letter-grade systems, and corruption: The case of Los Angeles County restaurant inspections

Makofske

2020

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In 1998, Los Angeles (LA) County adopted a mandatory disclosure policy aimed at inducing restaurant hygiene improvements. LA County restaurants receive numeric scores during unannounced hygiene inspections and then post letter grades in their windows based on broad intervals to which their inspection scores belong. This letter-grade system generates: relatively weak incentives for hygiene improvement at letter-grade thresholds, and relatively strong incentives for score manipulation below those thresholds. Using over 140,000 LA County restaurant inspections spanning October 2014 to September 2016, I test for manipulation by exploiting a feature of the county's scoring criteria. The violation of most health codes carries a prescribed 1, 2, or 4-point deduction. However, there are eleven health code violations where, depending on severity, 2 or 4 points may be deducted. Even when compared with inspections exhibiting better overall hygiene quality, restaurants on the margin of a higher letter grade are 28-40% more likely to receive the lesser point deduction on these violations. Restaurants on the margin are significantly more likely to receive the lesser deduction across all eleven violation types. That, and other characteristics of the data, suggest that these results do not reflect restaurants electively bunching at letter-grade thresholds. I find that scores were manipulated to improve letter grades in as many as 5,921 inspections (4.2% of the sample, and 26.56% of inspections where scoring decisions had letter-grade implications). JEL: D82, L15, I18, K32

show abstract

Quality Disclosure Programs and Internal Organizational Practices: Evidence from Airline Flight Delays

Cited by 40 publications

References 11 publications

Factors Influencing Flight Delays of a European Airline

Factors Influencing Flight Delays of a European Airline

Dynamic incentive effects of relative performance pay: A field experiment

Mandatory disclosure, letter-grade systems, and corruption: The case of Los Angeles County restaurant inspections

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About