This paper investigates the scope of indirect network effects in the home video game industry. We argue that the increasing prevalence of non-exclusive software gives rise to indirect network effects that exist between users of competing and incompatible hardware platforms. This is because software non-exclusivity, like hardware compatibility, allows a software firm to sell to a market broader than a single platform's installed base, leading to a dependence of any particular platform's software on all firms' installed bases. We look for evidence of these market-wide network effects by estimating a model of hardware demand and software supply. Our software supply equation allows the supply of games for a particular platform to depend not only on the installed base of that platform, but also on the installed base of competing platforms. Our results indicate the presence of both a platform-specific network effect and -in recent years -a crossplatform (or generation-wide) network effect. Our finding that the scope of indirect network effects in this industry has widened suggests one reason that this market, which is often cited as a canonical example of one with strong indirect network effects, is no longer dominated by a single platform.

We explore patterns of vertical integration in the US airline industry. Major airlines subcontract portions of their network to regional partners, which may or may not be owned. We investigate if ownership economizes on ex post renegotiation costs. We estimate whether airlines are more likely to use owned regionals on city pairs with adverse weather (which makes adaptation decisions more frequent) and on city pairs that are more integrated into the major's network (which raises the costs of having adaptation decisions resolved suboptimally). Our results suggest a robust empirical relationship between adaptation and vertical integration in this setting. (JEL L14, L22, L24, L93)

This paper investigates the scope of indirect network effects in the home video game industry. We argue that the increasing prevalence of non-exclusive software gives rise to indirect network effects that exist between users of competing and incompatible hardware platforms. This is because software non-exclusivity, like hardware compatibility, allows a software firm to sell to a market broader than a single platform's installed base, leading to a dependence of any particular platform's software on all firms' installed bases. We look for evidence of these market-wide network effects by estimating a model of hardware demand and software supply. Our software supply equation allows the supply of games for a particular platform to depend not only on the installed base of that platform, but also on the installed base of competing platforms. Our results indicate the presence of both a platform-specific network effect and -in recent years -a crossplatform (or generation-wide) network effect. Our finding that the scope of indirect network effects in this industry has widened suggests one reason that this market, which is often cited as a canonical example of one with strong indirect network effects, is no longer dominated by a single platform.

We investigate the effects of vertical integration on operational performance. Large U.S. airlines use regional partners to operate some of their flights. Regionals may be owned or governed through contracts. We estimate whether an airline's use of an owned, rather than independent, regional at an airport affects delays and cancellations on the airline's own flights out of that airport. We find that integrated airlines perform systematically better than nonintegrated airlines at the same airport on the same day. Furthermore, the performance advantage increases on days with adverse weather and when airports are more congested. These findings suggest that, in this setting, vertical integration may facilitate real-time adaptation decisions. Copyright (c) 2010, RAND..

We thank Danny Kim at NPD for answering our questions about the toy sales data and Kevin Mak at the Rotman Finance Lab for his assistance with assembling the stock price data. Molly Reckson provided capable research assistance. Financial support from the AIC Institute for Corporate Citizenship at the Rotman School of Management is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.