Pure Expressivism and Motivational Internalism

Toppinen, Teemu

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0008

Cited by 5 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…in light of these kinds of concerns, Gibbard (1993: 318-319;2003: 152-158) has proposed that the mismatch pattern arises when the motivationally efficacious states that constitute normative judgments become somehow distorted, such that their motivational effects are blocked (see also Björnsson & McPherson 2014;eriksson 2014;Toppinen 2015;cf. ridge 2015;Strandberg 2012).…”

Section: Do Noncognitivists Do Better?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment

Cline¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

A central source of support for expressivist accounts of normative discourse is the intimate relationship between normative judgment and motivation. expressivists argue that normative judgments must be noncognitive, desire-like states in order to be so tightly linked with motivation. Normative statements are then construed as expressions of these noncognitive states. in this paper, i draw on dual-process models in cognitive psychology to respond to this argument. According to my proposal, normative judgments are ordinary beliefs that are typically produced by two kinds of process: intuitive-affective processes and domain-general reasoning. When produced by the first kind of process, motivation and judgment tend to align. When produced by the second kind, motivation and judgment might not align. Since the first kind of process is the most common pathway of normative belief formation, normative judgments are typically accompanied by aligning motivation. This proposal enables cognitivists to explain the intimate link between normative judgment and motivation, thereby removing the major obstacle to interpreting normative statements truth-conditionally.

show abstract

Section: Do Noncognitivists Do Better?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment

Cline¹

2017

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It is an interesting question what the upshot of this view is for the debate between cognitivists and non-cognitivists. As with Rationality Internalism, there is no simple argument for non-cognitivism (for relevant discussion see Strandberg 2012 andToppinen 2015). For example, if all abnormal conditions could be understood as conditions that mask an underlying non-cognitive disposition, this would be grist for the non-cognitivist's mill.…”

Section: Normality Internalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ethical Judgment and Motivation

Faraci¹,

McPherson²

2017

The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Just to be clear, the claim is not that the utterance 'Murder is wrong, but one See (Toppinen 2015) for discussion of this issue. Schroeder's theory would be an example of a higher-order theory.…”

Section: The Other Half Of the Negation Problem: The Right Kind Of In...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But this target secondorder commitment is straightforwardly A-type inconsistent with (U1)-which is also a second-order commitment. On the other hand, if she does not satisfy (U2), she is 20 But see (Toppinen 2015) for criticism of higher-order attitude versions of expressivism. guilty of rational failing because of the failure of satisfaction.…”

Section: The Problems With Identifying ψ With Being Formentioning

confidence: 99%

Expression and Guidance in Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics

Baker

2017

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mark Schroeder's expressivist program has made substantial progress in providing a compositional semantics for normative terms. This paper argues that it risks achieving this semantic progress at the cost of abandoning a key theoretical motivation for embracing expressivism in the first place. The problem can be summarized as a dilemma. Either Schroeder must allow that there are cases in which agents are in disagreement with one another, or can make valid inferences, but that these disagreements or inferences are not expressible in natural language; or his version of expressivism must abandon one of the key theoretical advantages expressivist theories seemed to possess over cognitivism, the ability to provide a very straightforward explanation of the action-and attitude-guiding role of normative judgments.* Thanks to Jack Woods and anonymous referees for extensive comments and criticism.

show abstract

Pure Expressivism and Motivational Internalism

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment

Cognitivism, Motivation, and Dual-Process Approaches to Normative Judgment

Ethical Judgment and Motivation

Expression and Guidance in Schroeder’s Expressivist Semantics

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About