Public Attitudes on the Ethics of Deceptively Planting False Memories to Motivate Healthy Behavior

Nash, Robert A.; Berkowitz, Shari R.; Roche, Susan E.

doi:10.1002/acp.3274

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 42 publications

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“…Another possible explanation for subjects' reluctance to erase their negative memories is that they were wary of the general consequences of erasing a memory. For example, we know that many people believe that changing people's memories in therapy might have unintended negative consequences, and it is possible that some subjects decided not to erase their memory for this reason (Nash, Berkowitz, & Roche, 2016). But this explanation cannot fully account for our results.…”

Section: Alternate Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 80%

Negative memories serve functions in both adaptive and maladaptive ways

Burnell

Rasmussen

Garry

2020

Memory

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Autobiographical memories are said to serve at least three functions: they direct people's behaviour, inform their identity, and facilitate social bonding and communication. But much of the research on these three functions has not distinguished between memories that serve functions in adaptive ways from those that serve functions in maladaptive ways. Across two experiments, we asked subjects to provide either positive or negative memories. Then, to operationalize adaptive and maladaptive functions, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which those memories serve directive, self, and social functions in ways that "help" and in ways that "hurt." To investigate whether people believe the adaptive benefits of their memories outweigh any maladaptive effects, we also asked subjects how willing they would be to erase the memories if given the opportunity. We found that negative memories served functions in both helpful and hurtful ways, whereas positive memories were primarily helpful. Furthermore, the more helpful a memory was, the more reluctant subjects were to erase it. Conversely, the more hurtful a memory was, the more willing subjects were to erase it. These results suggest it is important to distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive functions when investigating the functions of autobiographical memory.

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Section: Alternate Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 80%

Negative memories serve functions in both adaptive and maladaptive ways

Burnell

Rasmussen

Garry

2020

Memory

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“…Although M&C do not discuss nonbelieved memories, they do give greater attention to the adaptiveness of false memories. Susceptibility to false memories might offer numerous specific benefits to the rememberer (Bernstein & Loftus 2009;Howe 2011;Nash et al 2016), but M&C propose that this susceptibility is also generally adaptive, because convincing ourselves of selfserving beliefs is an essential first step toward convincing others. They further propose a reciprocal benefit: adopting other people's beliefs into our own recollections can be "communicatively useful" as a means of enhancing our epistemic authority.…”

Section: Jennifer Nagelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Mahr¹,

Csibra²

2017

Behav Brain Sci

209

152

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Short Abstract-We propose a novel account of episodic memory function based on a conceptual and empirical analysis of its role in belief formation. We provide a critique of the view that episodic memory serves future-directed imagination, and argue that the central features of this capacity can instead be explained by the role it plays in human communication. On this view, episodic memory allows us to communicatively support our interpretations of the past by gauging when we can assert epistemic authority. This capacity is ineliminable in justification of, and negotiations about, social commitments established by past interactions.Long Abstract-Episodic memory has been analyzed in a number of different ways in both philosophy and psychology, and most controversy has centered on its self-referential, 'autonoetic' character. Here, we offer a comprehensive characterization of episodic memory in representational terms, and propose a novel functional account on this basis. We argue that episodic memory should be understood as a distinctive epistemic attitude taken towards an event simulation. On this view, episodic memory has a metarepresentational format and should not be equated with beliefs about the past. Instead, empirical findings suggest that the contents of human episodic memory are often constructed in the service of the explicit justification of such beliefs. Existing accounts of episodic memory function that have focused on explaining its constructive character through its role in 'future-oriented mental time travel' neither do justice to its capacity to ground veridical beliefs about the past nor to its representational format. We provide an account of the metarepresentational structure of episodic memory in terms of its role in communicative interaction. The generative nature of recollection allows us to represent and communicate the reasons for why we hold certain beliefs about the past. In this process, autonoesis corresponds to the capacity to determine when and how to assert epistemic authority in making claims about the past. A domain where such claims are indispensable are human social engagements. Such engagements commonly require the justification of entitlements and obligations, which is often possible only by explicit reference to specific past events.

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“…In our study, beliefs about the therapist’s competency depended on outcome information surrounding the false memory. Indeed, recent studies suggest that the public’s regard for techniques that elicit false memories is mixed, even in instances where the false memories may have beneficial effects (Nash, Berkowitz, & Roche, 2016). In the present study, although foresight participants did not relate competency to suggestiveness, hindsight participants did, and they rated the competency of the therapist as significantly lower than did the foresight participants.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptions of recovered memory therapy: Hindsight bias effects on judgments of memory veracity and therapist competence and responsibility.

Myers

Johnson

Shoemake

2017

Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice

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Recovered memory therapy (RMT) is viewed by memory experts as highly suggestive, and has long generated debate among advocates and critics. Less is known concerning how the public perceives RMT, as participants have generally been provided with brief or incomplete information about RMT in studies investigating beliefs about false memories. We examined whether the public recognizes the suggestive nature of RMT, and judges the competence of the therapist and the veracity of the memories accordingly. In addition, we investigated whether judgments surrounding RMT and therapist conduct depend on whether participants know the therapy ultimately led to a false memory. A total of 263 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to 1 of 8 conditions in a completely between-subjects factorial design that crossed 4 levels of therapy suggestiveness (control/suggestion/guided imagery/hypnosis) with 2 levels of outcome information about the memory report (foresight/hindsight). Participants with prior knowledge that the therapy produced a false memory (i.e., hindsight) rated the therapist as more responsible for the false memory and less competent than foresight participants. Foresight participants rated the RMT as more suggestive, but did not rate memory veracity or therapist competency any lower. Perceptions of memory veracity were only negatively impacted by the hindsight information. These findings suggest that individuals fail to connect suggestive recovery practices with memory veracity, and that perceptions of therapist competence and responsibility are largely attributable to knowledge of the harmful outcome of the therapy, rather than the techniques employed. Implications for RMT, therapist liability, and vulnerability to risky practices are discussed.

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Public Attitudes on the Ethics of Deceptively Planting False Memories to Motivate Healthy Behavior

Cited by 12 publications

References 42 publications

Negative memories serve functions in both adaptive and maladaptive ways

Negative memories serve functions in both adaptive and maladaptive ways

Why do we remember? The communicative function of episodic memory

Perceptions of recovered memory therapy: Hindsight bias effects on judgments of memory veracity and therapist competence and responsibility.

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