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Domestic “vaccine passports” are being implemented across the world as a way of increasing vaccinated people’s freedom of movement and to encourage vaccination. However, these vaccine passports may affect people’s vaccination decisions in unintended and undesirable ways. This cross-sectional study investigated whether people’s willingness and motivation to get vaccinated relate to their psychological needs (autonomy, competence and relatedness), and how vaccine passports might affect these needs. Across two countries and 1358 participants, we found that need frustration—particularly autonomy frustration—was associated with lower willingness to get vaccinated and with a shift from self-determined to external motivation. In Israel (a country with vaccine passports), people reported greater autonomy frustration than in the UK (a country without vaccine passports). Our findings suggest that control measures, such as domestic vaccine passports, may have detrimental effects on people’s autonomy, motivation, and willingness to get vaccinated. Policies should strive to achieve a highly vaccinated population by supporting individuals’ autonomous motivation to get vaccinated and using messages of autonomy and relatedness, rather than applying pressure and external controls.

Autobiographical memories are said to serve at least three functions: they direct people's behaviour, inform their identity, and facilitate social bonding and communication. But much of the research on these three functions has not distinguished between memories that serve functions in adaptive ways from those that serve functions in maladaptive ways. Across two experiments, we asked subjects to provide either positive or negative memories. Then, to operationalize adaptive and maladaptive functions, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which those memories serve directive, self, and social functions in ways that "help" and in ways that "hurt." To investigate whether people believe the adaptive benefits of their memories outweigh any maladaptive effects, we also asked subjects how willing they would be to erase the memories if given the opportunity. We found that negative memories served functions in both helpful and hurtful ways, whereas positive memories were primarily helpful. Furthermore, the more helpful a memory was, the more reluctant subjects were to erase it. Conversely, the more hurtful a memory was, the more willing subjects were to erase it. These results suggest it is important to distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive functions when investigating the functions of autobiographical memory.

Aggregate metrics and lack of access to results limit understanding

IntroductionDigital technologies have the capacity to impact psychological wellbeing in both positive and negative ways. Improving technologies with respect to wellbeing requires nuanced understanding of this impact and reliable ways to measure it. Here, we aim to further this understanding by investigating the relations between psychological needs and people's evaluations of technologies (with respect to satisfaction, usability, and measures of value).MethodAcross two studies with 1,521 participants, we improved and validated four scales that were first put forward as part of the METUX model of technology interaction. These scales measure psychological needs in the life, behavior, task, and interface spheres of experience. We applied these scales to four separate technologies (Facebook, TikTok, Blackboard, and Moodle), and examined the relationships between people's need satisfaction and frustration in the four spheres of experience and their overall evaluations of the technologies.Results and discussionEach of the four scales had good psychometric properties across the four technologies. For each sphere of experience, psychological need satisfaction and frustration were associated with standard measures of usability and user satisfaction, and correlation patterns supported the METUX model and its approach to differentiating spheres of technology experience.

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People can come to “remember” experiences they never had, and these false memories—much like memories for real experiences—can serve a variety of helpful and harmful functions. Sometimes, though, people realize one of their memories is false, and retract their belief in it. These “retracted memories” continue to have many of the same phenomenological characteristics as their believed memories. But can they also continue to serve functions? Across four experiments, we asked subjects to rate the extent to which their retracted memories serve helpful and harmful functions and compared these functions with those served by “genuine” autobiographical memories. People rated their retracted memories as serving both helpful and harmful functions, much like their genuine memories. In addition, we found only weak relationships between people’s belief in their memories and the extent to which those memories served perceived functions. These results suggest memories can serve functions even in the absence of belief and highlight the potential for false memories to affect people’s thinking and behavior even after people have retracted them.

Evaluating the truthfulness of new information is a difficult and complex task. Notably, there is currently no unified theoretical framework that addresses the questions of (1) how individuals discern whether political information is true or (deliberately) false, (2) under what conditions individuals are most susceptible to believing misinformation, and (3) how the structure of political and communicative environments skews cognitive processes of truth, discernment, and interpretation generation. To move forward, we propose the Misinformation Receptivity Framework (MRF). Building on Bayesian and probabilistic models of cognition, the MRF suggests that we can conceptualize misinformation receptivity as a cognitive inference problem in which the reliability of incoming misinformation is weighed against the reliability of prior beliefs. This “reliability-weighting” process can model when individuals adopt or reject misinformation, as well as the ways in which they creatively generate interpretations rather than passively discern truth versus falsehood. Moreover, certain communication contexts can lead people to rely excessively on incoming (mis)information or conversely to rely excessively on prior beliefs. The MRF postulates how such environmental properties can heighten the persuasiveness of different kinds of misinformation. For instance, the MRF predicts that noisy communication contexts, in which the reliability of inputs is ambiguous, make people susceptible to highly partisan and ideological misinformation or disinformation that amplifies their existing belief systems. By contrast, the MRF predicts that contextual instability renders people susceptible to misinformation that would be considered extreme or worldview-incongruent in conditions of stability. The MRF formally delineates the interactions between cognitive and communicative mechanisms, offering insights and testable hypotheses on when, how, and why different kinds of misinformation proliferate.