Much has been written in the educational psychology literature about effective feedback and how to deliver it. However, it is equally important to understand how learners actively receive, engage with, and implement feedback. This article reports a systematic review of the research evidence pertaining to this issue. Through an analysis of 195 outputs published between 1985 and early 2014, we identified various factors that have been proposed to influence the likelihood of feedback being used. Furthermore, we identified diverse interventions with the common aim of supporting and promoting learners' agentic engagement with feedback processes. We outline the various components used in these interventions, and the reports of their successes and limitations. Moreover we propose a novel taxonomy of four recipience processes targeted by these interventions. This review and taxonomy provide a theoretical basis for conceptualizing learners' responsibility within feedback dialogues and for guiding the strategic design and evaluation of interventions.

For feedback to be effective, it must be used by the receiver. Prior research has outlined numerous reasons why students' use of feedback is sometimes limited, but there has been little systematic exploration of these barriers. In 11 activity-oriented focus groups, 31 undergraduate Psychology students discussed how they use assessment feedback. The data revealed many barriers that inhibit use of feedback, ranging from students' difficulties with decoding terminology, to their unwillingness to expend effort. Thematic analysis identified four underlying psychological processes: awareness, cognisance, agency, and volition. We argue that these processes should be considered when designing interventions to encourage students' engagement with feedback. Whereas the barriers identified could all in principle be removed, we propose that doing so would typically require-or would at least benefit froma sharing of responsibility between teacher and student. The data highlight the importance of training students to be proactive receivers of feedback.

A recent study showed that many people spontaneously report vivid memories of events that they do not believe to have occurred [1]. In the present experiment we tested for the first time whether, after powerful false memories have been created, debriefing might leave behind nonbelieved memories for the fake events. In Session 1 participants imitated simple actions, and in Session 2 they saw doctored video-recordings containing clips that falsely suggested they had performed additional (fake) actions. As in earlier studies, this procedure created powerful false memories. In Session 3, participants were debriefed and told that specific actions in the video were not truly performed. Beliefs and memories for all critical actions were tested before and after the debriefing. Results showed that debriefing undermined participants' beliefs in fake actions, but left behind residual memory-like content. These results indicate that debriefing can leave behind vivid false memories which are no longer believed, and thus we demonstrate for the first time that the memory of an event can be experimentally dissociated from the belief in the event's occurrence. These results also confirm that belief in and memory for an event can be independently-occurring constructs.

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More powerful computers and affordable digital video equipment means that desktop video editing is now accessible and popular. In two experiments, we investigated whether seeing fake video evidence, or simply being told that video evidence exists, could lead people to believe they committed an act they never did. Subjects completed a computerized gambling task, and when they returned later the same day, we falsely accused them of cheating on the task. All of the subjects were told that incriminating video evidence existed, and half were also exposed to a fake video. See-video subjects were more likely to confess without resistance, and to internalize the act than told-video subjects, and see-video subjects tended to confabulate details more often than told-video subjects. We offer a metacognitive-based account of our results. 3

When people rapidly judge the truth of claims presented with or without related but nonprobative photos, the photos tend to inflate the subjective truth of those claims--a "truthiness" effect (Newman et al., 2012). For example, people more often judged the claim "Macadamia nuts are in the same evolutionary family as peaches" to be true when the claim appeared with a photo of a bowl of macadamia nuts than when it appeared alone. We report several replications of that effect and 3 qualitatively new findings: (a) in a within-subjects design, when people judged claims paired with a mix of related, unrelated, or no photos, related photos produced truthiness but unrelated photos had no significant effect relative to no photos; (b) in a mixed design, when people judged claims paired with related (or unrelated) and no photos, related photos produced truthiness and unrelated photos produced "falseness;" and (c) in a fully between design, when people judged claims paired with either related, unrelated, or no photos, neither truthiness nor falsiness occurred. Our results suggest that photos influence people's judgments when a discrepancy arises in the expected ease of processing, and also support a mechanism in which-against a backdrop of an expected standard-related photos help people generate pseudoevidence to support claims.

Recent literature has argued that whereas remembering the past and imagining the future make use of shared cognitive substrates, simulating future events places heavier demands on executive resources. These propositions were explored in 3 experiments comparing the impact of imagery and concurrent task demands on speed and accuracy of past event retrieval and future event simulation. Results provide support for the suggestion that both past and future episodes can be constructed through 2 mechanisms: a noneffortful "direct" pathway and a controlled, effortful "generative" pathway. However, limited evidence emerged for the suggestion that simulating of future, compared with retrieving past, episodes places heavier demands on executive resources; only under certain conditions did it emerge as a more error prone and lengthier process. The findings are discussed in terms of how retrieval and simulation make use of the same cognitive substrates in subtly different ways.

In prior research on false autobiographical beliefs and memories, subjects have been asked to imagine fictional events and they have been exposed to false evidence that indicates the fictional events occurred. But what are the relative contributions of imagination and false evidence toward false belief and memory construction? Subjects observed and copied various simple actions, then viewed doctored videos that suggested they had performed extra actions, and they imagined performing some of those and some other actions. Subjects returned two weeks later for a memory test. False evidence or imagination alone was often sufficient to cause belief and memory distortions; the two techniques in combination appeared to have additive or even superadditive effects. The results bear on the mechanisms underlying false beliefs and memories, and we propose legal and clinical applications of these findings