Propositions on the cheap

Grzankowski, Alex; Buchanan, Ray

doi:10.1007/s11098-018-1168-6

Cited by 25 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Propositional accounts can be shared with interlocutors, used to signal group membership, as well as form and benefit from coalitions 45 . Given this, propositional accounts of belief tend to align believing with having a capacity for language 46,47,48 . However, conceiving of propositions as causal Bayes nets has drawn some to speculate that propositional attitudes are not unique to humans (i.e., language is not required to form propositions 49, 50 ), although not without opposition 51 .…”

Section: What Is a Belief?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Psychedelics Change Beliefs?

McGovern¹,

Leptourgos²,

Hutchinson³

et al. 2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Renewed interest in psychedelics has reignited the debate about whether and how they change human beliefs. In both the clinical and social-cognitive domains, psychedelic consumption may be accompanied by profound, and sometimes lasting, belief changes. We review these changes and their possible underlying mechanisms. Rather than inducing de novo beliefs, we argue psychedelics may instead change the impact of affect and of others’ suggestions on how beliefs are imputed. Critically, we find that baseline beliefs (in the possible effects of psychedelics, for example) might color the acute effects of psychedelics as well as longer term changes. If we are to harness the apparent potential of psychedelics in the clinic and for human flourishing more generally, these possibilities must be addressed empirically.

show abstract

Section: What Is a Belief?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do Psychedelics Change Beliefs?

McGovern¹,

Leptourgos²,

Hutchinson³

et al. 2021

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This line of thought meshes well with the recent trend in the propositions literature to analyze propositions as kinds or abstract groupings of more fundamental, concrete representational things. I take Soames (2014), Hanks (2011Hanks ( , 2013, and Grzankowski and Buchanan (2019) as representatives of this approach. 4 If we posit kinds of RVs and suppose that they are truthbearers in a derivative sense, then it is plausible that we can accept both (3) and the The problem of unarticulated truths RV-First View.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The problem of unarticulated truths

Odland

2023

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In recent years, a variety of philosophers have argued that the fundamental bearers of representational properties like truth are concrete particulars produced by cognitive agents-representational vehicles ("RVs"), as I will call them. This view apparently conflicts with other judgments that are part of our common sense understanding of truth. For instance, it is plausible that there are truths about the Milky Way that have and never will never be articulated by anyone. Whatever these truths are, it looks like they cannot be RVs, because an RV is articulated just in case it exists. In this paper, I argue that it is consistent to hold that the fundamental truth-bearers are representational vehicles, while also acknowledging the existence of unarticulated truths. I argue that truth is a property that derivatively holds of kinds of RVs, that these provide the basis for our judgments that there are unarticulated truths, and I defend the view against putative counter-examples.

show abstract

“…The idea that thoughts are objects of abstraction is underexplored. For some discussion, see Field (2017),Grzankowski and Buchanan (2019),Schiffer (2003) andWrigley (2006).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mates and the hierarchy

Rattan

Durand

2022

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Mates’s Puzzle has flown below many philosophers’ radar, despite its relations to both Frege’s Puzzle and the Paradox of Analysis. We explain the relations amongst these puzzles on the way to arguing that Mates’s Puzzle suggests a generalization of Frege’s Puzzle, and of the sense-reference distinction itself, in the form of hierarchy of senses. We explain how Mates’s Puzzle and the hierarchy, to different degrees, illuminate each other, and how their connection is missed in the literature. However, we argue that the potential of Mates’s Puzzle to illuminate the hierarchy is yet to be fully actualised. We suggest that in order to do better, we need to formulate Mates’s Puzzle as a puzzle in the philosophy of thought and not as puzzle in the philosophy of language. What is needed, to which the present paper is a precursor, is an account of the cognitive significance of higher-order senses.

show abstract

Propositions on the cheap

Cited by 25 publications

References 21 publications

Do Psychedelics Change Beliefs?

Do Psychedelics Change Beliefs?

The problem of unarticulated truths

Mates and the hierarchy

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About