This review from the International Consortium on Hallucinations Research intends to question the pertinence of the excitatory-to-inhibitory (E/I) imbalance hypothesis as a model for hallucinations. A large number of studies suggest that subtle impairments of the E/I balance are involved in neurological and psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia. Emerging evidence also points to a role of the E/I balance in maintaining stable perceptual representations, suggesting it may be a plausible model for hallucinations. In support, hallucinations have been linked to inhibitory deficits as shown with impairment of gamma-aminobutyric acid transmission, N-methyl-d-aspartate receptor plasticity, reductions in gamma-frequency oscillations, hyperactivity in sensory cortices, and cognitive inhibition deficits. However, the mechanisms by which E/I dysfunctions at the cellular level might relate to clinical symptoms and cognitive deficits remain unclear. Given recent data advances in the field of clinical neuroscience, it is now possible to conduct a synthesis of available data specifically related to hallucinations. These findings are integrated with the latest computational frameworks of hallucinations, and recommendations for future research are provided.

The COVID-19 pandemic has made the world seem less predictable. Such crises can lead people to feel that others are a threat. Here, we show that the initial phase of the pandemic in 2020 increased individuals' paranoia and made their belief updating more erratic. A proactive lockdown made people's belief updating less capricious. However, state-mandated mask-wearing increased paranoia and induced more erratic behaviour. This was most evident in states where adherence to mask-wearing rules was poor but where rule following is typically more common. Computational analyses of participant behaviour suggested that people with higher paranoia expected the task to be more unstable. People who were more paranoid endorsed conspiracies about mask-wearing and potential vaccines and the QAnon conspiracy theories. These beliefs were associated with erratic task behaviour and changed priors. Taken together, we found that real-world uncertainty increases paranoia and influences laboratory task behaviour. ArticlesNATure HumAN BeHAVIOur (BF 10 = 0.163, strong evidence for the null hypothesis) or reversals achieved (BF 10 = 0.210, strong evidence for the null hypothesis) between social and non-social tasks. Computational modelling. Probabilistic reversal learning involves decision-making under uncertainty. The reasons for decisions may not be manifest in simple counts of choices or errors. By modelling Reward probability (%) 10

The recent renaissance of psychedelic science has reignited interest in the similarity of drug-induced experiences to those more commonly observed in psychiatric contexts such as the schizophrenia-spectrum. This report from a multidisciplinary working group of the International Consortium on Hallucinations Research (ICHR) addresses this issue, putting special emphasis on hallucinatory experiences. We review evidence collected at different scales of understanding, from pharmacology to brain-imaging, phenomenology and anthropology, highlighting similarities and differences between hallucinations under psychedelics and in the schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Finally, we attempt to integrate these findings using computational approaches and conclude with recommendations for future research.

Psychotic symptoms, i.e., hallucinations and delusions, involve gross departures from conscious apprehension of consensual reality; respectively, perceiving and believing things that, according to same culture peers, do not obtain. In schizophrenia, those experiences are often related to abnormal sense of control over one's own actions, often expressed as a distorted sense of agency (i.e., passivity symptoms). Cognitive and computational neuroscience have furnished an account of these experiences and beliefs in terms of the brain's generative model of the world, which underwrites inferences to the best explanation of current and future states, in order to behave adaptively. Inference then involves a reliability-based trade off of predictions and prediction errors, and psychotic symptoms may arise as departures from this inference process, either an over-or under-weighting of priors relative to prediction errors. Surprisingly, there is empirical evidence in favor of both positions. Relatedly, there is evidence for both an enhanced and a diminished sense of agency in schizophrenia. How can this be? We argue that there is more than one generative model in the brain, and that ego-and allo-centric models operate in tandem. In brief, ego-centric models implement corollary discharge signals that cancel out the effects of self-generated actions while allo-centric models compare several hypothesis regarding the causes of sensory inputs (including the self among the potential causes). The two parallel hierarchies give rise to different levels of agency, with ego-centric models subserving "feelings of agency" and allo-centric predictions giving rise to "judgements of agency." Those two components are weighted according to their reliability and combined, generating a higher-level "sense of agency." We suggest that in schizophrenia a failure of corollary discharges to suppress self-generated inputs results in the absence of a "feeling of agency" and in a compensatory enhancement of allo-centric priors, which might underlie hallucinations, delusions of control but also, under certain circumstances, the enhancement of "judgments of agency." We discuss the consequences of such a model, and potential courses of action that could lead to its falsification.

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Hallucinations can occur in different sensory modalities, both simultaneously and serially in time. They have typically been studied in clinical populations as phenomena occurring in a single sensory modality. Hallucinatory experiences occurring in multiple sensory systems—multimodal hallucinations (MMHs)—are more prevalent than previously thought and may have greater adverse impact than unimodal ones, but they remain relatively underresearched. Here, we review and discuss: (1) the definition and categorization of both serial and simultaneous MMHs, (2) available assessment tools and how they can be improved, and (3) the explanatory power that current hallucination theories have for MMHs. Overall, we suggest that current models need to be updated or developed to account for MMHs and to inform research into the underlying processes of such hallucinatory phenomena. We make recommendations for future research and for clinical practice, including the need for service user involvement and for better assessment tools that can reliably measure MMHs and distinguish them from other related phenomena.

Self-deception, paranoia, and overconfidence involve misbeliefs about the self, others, and world. They are often considered mistaken. Here we explore whether they might be adaptive, and further, whether they might be explicable in Bayesian terms. We administered a difficult perceptual judgment task with and without social influence (suggestions from a cooperating or competing partner). Crucially, the social influence was uninformative. We found that participants heeded the suggestions most under the most uncertain conditions and that they did so with high confidence, particularly if they were more paranoid. Model fitting to participant behavior revealed that their prior beliefs changed depending on whether the partner was a collaborator or competitor, however, those beliefs did not differ as a function of paranoia. Instead, paranoia, self-deception, and overconfidence were associated with participants’ perceived instability of their own performance. These data are consistent with the idea that self-deception, paranoia, and overconfidence flourish under uncertainty, and have their roots in low self-esteem, rather than excessive social concern. The model suggests that spurious beliefs can have value–self-deception is irrational yet can facilitate optimal behavior. This occurs even at the expense of monetary rewards, perhaps explaining why self-deception and paranoia contribute to costly decisions which can spark financial crashes and devastating wars.