Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature-we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson's challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against only the most heavily committed kind, and leave the less heavily committed kinds untouched. Further, we argue that Williamson's elaboration of lessons from his arguments point in a direction opposite of his own conclusions and give vivid articulation and support to epistemological conceptions. We suggest also that skepticism about Williamson's larger metaphilosophical conclusions-according to which understanding plays no special role in the epistemology of philosophy-may be in order. What is it to understand or grasp a concept? Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes grasp of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? Or is the nature of understanding wholly non-epistemic? In this paper we consider these questions. We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature-we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding (sometimes 'epistemological conceptions', for short). 1 To focus our discussion, we consider some work by Tim Williamson that vigorously challenges epistemological conceptions of understanding (Williamson 2007). We distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson's arguments succeed against only the most heavily committed kind of epistemological conception, and leave the less heavily committed kinds untouched. Further, we argue that Williamson's elaboration of the lessons to be drawn from his arguments point in a direction opposite of his own conclusions and give vivid articulation and support to the less heavily committed epistemological conceptions. We shall also, briefly, consider some potential consequences for the metaphilosophical questions that provide the initial motivation for Williamson's view. What does conceptual competence or understanding make epistemically available for philosophy? Williamson's answer is: "to a first approximation…nothing" (2007: 77). We suggest that skepticism about Williamson's larger metaphilosophical conclusions may be in order. The paper is arranged as follows. §1 explains and draws distinctions between three 2 kinds of epistemological conceptions of understanding, and explains why Williamson's argument needs to generalize along certain dimensions in order to be effective against epistemological conceptions in general. §2 recounts Williamson's argument against understanding-assent links, and asks whether there are resources...
The connections between theories of concepts and issues of knowledge and epistemic normativity are complex and controversial. According to the general, broadly Fregean, view that stands in the background of this paper, these connections are taken not only to exist, but also to be fundamental to issues about the individuation of concepts. This kind of view fleshed out should clarify the nature and role of epistemic norms, and of different kinds of epistemic norms, in concept individuation. This paper takes up an aspect of this general task and tries to make explicit the nature and role of intellectual norms, and to argue that extant paradigms for theorizing concepts fail because they fail to recognize the nature and individuative relevance of intellectual norms.The connections between theories of concepts and issues of knowledge and epistemic normativity are complex and controversial. According to the general, broadly Fregean, view that stands in the background of this paper, these connections are taken not only to exist, but also to be fundamental to issues about the individuation of concepts. This kind of view fleshed out should clarify the nature and role of epistemic norms, and of different kinds of epistemic norms, in concept individuation. This paper takes up an aspect of this general task and tries to make explicit the nature and role of intellectual norms, and to argue Intellect and Concept 2 that extant paradigms for theorizing concepts fail because they fail to recognize the nature and individuative relevance of intellectual norms.I approach the issues by thinking through some ideas in Tyler Burge's classic 1986 paper, 'Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind'. The background in Burge's paper is described in §1. In the broadest outline, Burge's paper envisions an individuative connection between intellectual norms and concepts grounded in the kind of incomplete understanding present and perhaps even ubiquitous in philosophical discourse and method. This paper clarifies and explains these ideas, and their critical consequences.2 §2 considers and develops two general challenges to the key notion of incomplete understanding, challenges that criticize the notion for being overly intellectualized and motivationally unstable. §3 describes two paradigmatic views of conceptswhat I call Concepts as Use and Concepts as Pure Reference-and the role of the challenges to incomplete understanding in reinforcing the theoretical space spanned by the two paradigmatic views. This theoretical space is the target of my arguments in § §4-7. §4 argues against a fortified version of Concepts as Use and the challenge to incomplete understanding concerning over-intellectualization that supports it. §5 fixes and clarifies the ideas of §4 with a critical discussion of Robin Jeshion's (2000) illuminating argument against infallibilism about the a priori, an argument that makes key use of the notion of incomplete understanding. §6 argues against Concepts as Pure Reference and in particular against the challenge to incom...
Does the epistemology of disagreement have significant consequences for theories of conceptual understanding? I argue that it does. I argue that the epistemology of disagreement manifests the existence of a special kind of concept, perspectival modes of metarepresentation, a kind of concept instances of which figure in the thinking about thoughts that occurs in deep disagreement. These perspectival modes of metarepresentation are de re modes of presentation of thoughts themselves – hence de re modes of metarepresentation – in which one and the same thought is presented to higher‐order thinking about thoughts in different ways. These modes or ways are de re and perspectival because they are individuated by facts about whether the thought being thought about is the grasped or understood propositional object of one's own or another's thinking. I outline a broadly Fregean framework for theorizing conceptual understanding and draw out three significant consequences of the existence of perspectival modes of metarepresentation for theories of conceptual understanding: they (1) constitute a new philosophical motivation for a restricted fragment of what Terence Parsons calls a “libertine” hierarchy of Fregean sense; (2) provide, against David Chalmers, examples of a priori equivalences that are nevertheless cognitively significant; and (3) constitute a novel and pervasive example of Kripkean ‘Paderewski’‐type designators.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
hi@scite.ai
10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614
Henderson, NV 89052, USA
Copyright © 2024 scite LLC. All rights reserved.
Made with 💙 for researchers
Part of the Research Solutions Family.