Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective

Rattan, Gurpreet

doi:10.1111/phib.12038

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…According to this explanation, the rational stress that another's conflicting judgement poses for one fails, in deep disagreement, to be transferred cleanly from their perspective to one's own perspective. The more general consequence for the epistemology of disagreement is not to reveal new territory for dogmatic or sceptical epistemological outlooks but to manifest the nature of the cognition – metarepresentational, active and evaluative cognition – that goes on at the epistemic limits of intersubjective understanding (see Rattan, , section 3).…”

Section: A Thought Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is conflict here between two norms of deep disagreement, one intrasubjective, the other intersubjective (see Rattan, , section 3). The first norm directs one to attain comprehensive justification of one's view in which the norms, principles, and rules – including conceptual norms – invoked in one's comprehensive justification have themselves been subject to and passed critical reflective scrutiny.…”

Section: Interpreting the Thought Experiment: Perspectival Modes Of Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In conceptual analysis, there is not a further question to be answered about whether the concept that one is thinking about in formulating analyses is the same concept as the concept that one is thinking with in forming first‐order views about cases. This is presupposed and part of conceptual competence with the concept of the concept that one uses to think about the concept being analysed (see, Rattan, , section 3). But while this holds within perspectives, it does not hold, at least in deep disagreement, across perspectives .…”

Section: Interpreting the Thought Experiment: Perspectival Modes Of Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to the dialectical account, the epistemic significance of disagreement is to highlight the existence of this mental state and its conditions of operation, in rational interaction at the epistemic limits of intersubjective understanding . For defence of these ideas, see Rattan ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Disagreement and Conceptual Understanding

Rattan

2018

Theoria

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Does the epistemology of disagreement have significant consequences for theories of conceptual understanding? I argue that it does. I argue that the epistemology of disagreement manifests the existence of a special kind of concept, perspectival modes of metarepresentation, a kind of concept instances of which figure in the thinking about thoughts that occurs in deep disagreement. These perspectival modes of metarepresentation are de re modes of presentation of thoughts themselves – hence de re modes of metarepresentation – in which one and the same thought is presented to higher‐order thinking about thoughts in different ways. These modes or ways are de re and perspectival because they are individuated by facts about whether the thought being thought about is the grasped or understood propositional object of one's own or another's thinking. I outline a broadly Fregean framework for theorizing conceptual understanding and draw out three significant consequences of the existence of perspectival modes of metarepresentation for theories of conceptual understanding: they (1) constitute a new philosophical motivation for a restricted fragment of what Terence Parsons calls a “libertine” hierarchy of Fregean sense; (2) provide, against David Chalmers, examples of a priori equivalences that are nevertheless cognitively significant; and (3) constitute a novel and pervasive example of Kripkean ‘Paderewski’‐type designators.

show abstract

Section: A Thought Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Interpreting the Thought Experiment: Perspectival Modes Of Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Interpreting the Thought Experiment: Perspectival Modes Of Mmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Disagreement and Conceptual Understanding

Rattan

2018

Theoria

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This occurs in the epistemic evaluation of others thinkers that goes on in deep disagreement. For discussion see Rattan ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth Incorporated

Rattan

2015

Nous

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What is the cognitive value of the concept of truth? What epistemic difference does the concept of truth make to those who grasp it? This paper employs a new perspective for thinking about the concept of truth and recent debates concerning it, organized around the question of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. The paper aims to defend a substantively correct and dialectically optimal account of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. This perspective is employed in understanding the critical discussion around what Hartry Field (2001a) has called “the incorporation model” for extending a deflationary view of truth to foreign sentences. Field's original intentions in discussing the incorporation model were to defend the deflationary view from some counterintuitive consequences concerning the understanding of truth attributions to foreign sentences. However, more recently, philosophers unencumbered by deflationary commitments have taken over the incorporation model for their own inflationary purposes. In particular, and in my terms, these philosophers can be understood as making what I argue is the ultimately too radical suggestion that the cognitive value of the concept of truth is to allow the incorporation not only of the linguistically foreign, but also of the conceptually alien. I clarify this dialectic en route to explaining and arguing for the cognitive inflationary view, according to which the cognitive value of the concept of truth is is to make possible the proprietary kind and quality of knowledge allowed by reflective clarity over the concepts and thoughts that one already has.

show abstract

Introduction to the Epistemology of Disagreement

Lougheed

2019

Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective

Cited by 8 publications

References 24 publications

Disagreement and Conceptual Understanding

Disagreement and Conceptual Understanding

Truth Incorporated

Introduction to the Epistemology of Disagreement

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About