Truth Incorporated

Abstract

What is the cognitive value of the concept of truth? What epistemic difference does the concept of truth make to those who grasp it? This paper employs a new perspective for thinking about the concept of truth and recent debates concerning it, organized around the question of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. The paper aims to defend a substantively correct and dialectically optimal account of the cognitive value of the concept of truth. This perspective is employed in understanding the critical discussion around what Hartry Field (2001a) has called “the incorporation model” for extending a deflationary view of truth to foreign sentences. Field's original intentions in discussing the incorporation model were to defend the deflationary view from some counterintuitive consequences concerning the understanding of truth attributions to foreign sentences. However, more recently, philosophers unencumbered by deflationary commitments have taken over the incorporation model for their own inflationary purposes. In particular, and in my terms, these philosophers can be understood as making what I argue is the ultimately too radical suggestion that the cognitive value of the concept of truth is to allow the incorporation not only of the linguistically foreign, but also of the conceptually alien. I clarify this dialectic en route to explaining and arguing for the cognitive inflationary view, according to which the cognitive value of the concept of truth is is to make possible the proprietary kind and quality of knowledge allowed by reflective clarity over the concepts and thoughts that one already has.

Understanding Semantic Coordination in Cognition

“…Reflective judgment can then conclude that that p is true, and on the basis of this, a thinker can judge that p. The rationality of reflective judgment on the basis of conceptual analysis thus partly consists in the rationality of the transition of semantic descent (for further discussion, see Rattan 2016). Let us back up to reconsider the view that semantic coordination plays a role in conceptual analysis.…”

“…Then it can be determined, with clarity, which thought should be judged true given the evidential situation. Reflective judgment can then conclude that that p is true, and on the basis of this, a thinker can judge that p. The rationality of reflective judgment on the basis of conceptual analysis thus partly consists in the rationality of the transition of semantic descent (for further discussion, see Rattan 2016).…”