2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.06.117
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Promoting the market and system integration of renewable energies through premium schemes—A case study of the German market premium

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 81 publications
(39 citation statements)
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“…The market premium pays for the difference between a set reference price and the average market value of the electricity generated, calculated on a monthly ex-post basis. Plant operators which sell electricity primarily when market prices are high can generate revenues above the average market values used in the premium's calculation, resulting in incentives for demand-oriented production [27,68]. However, the strength of these incentives depends on the spread between base and peak hour prices on EPEX spot markets (i.e.…”
Section: Policy Incentives For Flexible Power Generation From Biomassmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The market premium pays for the difference between a set reference price and the average market value of the electricity generated, calculated on a monthly ex-post basis. Plant operators which sell electricity primarily when market prices are high can generate revenues above the average market values used in the premium's calculation, resulting in incentives for demand-oriented production [27,68]. However, the strength of these incentives depends on the spread between base and peak hour prices on EPEX spot markets (i.e.…”
Section: Policy Incentives For Flexible Power Generation From Biomassmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, if the rationale for supporting bioelectricity as a comparatively costly RES technology is based on its option value as a flexibility option, specific flexibility requirements are necessary to incentivise the development and use of technological and organisational innovations needed for flexibility provision. In part, this necessity for specific flexibility rules derives from the structure of market premium incentives-receiving the market premium is tied to actual feed-in, so that in absence of the requirement of having a PQ of at least 2, bioelectricity producers have an incentive to feed-in electricity even in times of low electricity prices, as long as the sum of electricity price and expected market premium is above marginal production costs [68]. As a potential alternative to production-based support, a capacity-based premium distorts market signals less [104]; however, it may bring about new distortions in investment decisions, by incentivising a maximisation of capacity without regard for "optimal" PQ value.…”
Section: Implications For the Remuneration Of Flexible Bioelectricitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Compared to a feed-in tariff system, the FiP creates an incentive to produce electricity when it is needed most (Hiroux and Saguan, 2010;Gawel and Purkus, 2013) because the plant owner total remuneration will rise with increasing electricity prices. Everything else being equal, investors will favor projects which deliver electricity when prices are high, hence facilitating the integration of intermittent renewable energy into the electricity system (Langniss et al, 2009).…”
Section: Feed-in Premiummentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Despite a recent fall in the cost of wind and particularly of solar power, intermittent renewable energy technologies are not competitive at current market prices (Gawel and Purkus, 2013) and few intermittent power projects would be realized without some type of support.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Um Anreize für einen Wechsel zu setzen, müssen Produzenten jedoch für Risiken wie den Ausgleich von Prognosefehlern und Vermarktungskosten kompensiert werden (Fraunhofer-ISI et al 2011). Den hieraus resultierenden, zusätzlichen Förderkosten steht der systemische Nutzen einer bedarfsorientierten Einspeisung entgegen, wenn sich die durch das Prämienmodell gesetzten Anreize als effektiv erweisen (Gawel und Purkus 2013a, 2013b …”
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