2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.ajic.2015.05.021
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Prolonged delay for controlling KPC-2–producing Klebsiella pneumoniae outbreak: The role of clinical management

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
11
0
1

Year Published

2016
2016
2020
2020

Publication Types

Select...
7

Relationship

0
7

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 13 publications
(13 citation statements)
references
References 26 publications
1
11
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…to link episodes within the appropriate serial interval rather than “siblings” from the same infector episode). This baseline window was consistent with French epidemiological data on observed delays before detection of CPE cases within a hospital following transfer of colonized patients 21 , 22 . It was also supported by the sensitivity analysis results where we observed that, among all windows, it provided one of the lowest observed mean distance as well as one the largest difference from the permutations in 2015 (Supplement 3 ).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 89%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…to link episodes within the appropriate serial interval rather than “siblings” from the same infector episode). This baseline window was consistent with French epidemiological data on observed delays before detection of CPE cases within a hospital following transfer of colonized patients 21 , 22 . It was also supported by the sensitivity analysis results where we observed that, among all windows, it provided one of the lowest observed mean distance as well as one the largest difference from the permutations in 2015 (Supplement 3 ).…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 89%
“…In a multi-hospital outbreak of carbapenemase-producing Klebsiella pneumoniae (KPC), two patient contacts were transferred and detected positive in two other hospital facilities 15 and 29 days after the detection of the hospital index cases 21 . In another KPC outbreak, following patient transfers out of the hospital in which the outbreak originated, KPC colonization was detected in two other hospitals respectively 19 and 25 days after detection of the index case in the original hospital 22 .…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…2 The nature of plasmid-mediated carbapenemases such as class A enzymes of the KPC type, zinc-dependent class B metalloβ-lactamases of mainly NDM, IMP, and VIM types, and class D carbapenemase of OXA-48 type facilitates global transmission and causes numerous outbreaks of CPE in the healthcare settings. [3][4][5] Failure in recognizing asymptomatic carriers may result in nosocomial transmission 6 or even country-wide outbreak. 7 Therefore, enhanced infection control measures such as active surveillance, isolation and cohorting of CPE patients with dedicated nursing staff and medical equipment, and daily bathing with chlorhexidine gluconate have been implemented to control the spread of CPE in the endemic settings.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Healthcare-associated outbreaks of multidrug-resistant gram-negative organisms are well documented [53,59,60]. The establishment of an outbreak management team provides best practice for responding to CPE within a health facility [4,13,26,58]. An outbreak management team may be activated at the discretion of the relevant lead within the health facility.…”
Section: Rationale and Commentarymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An outbreak management team should be established, led by a health facility executive, with representatives from bed management, infection prevention and control, infectious diseases and/or microbiology, unit/unit manager(s), relevant clinical team(s), and cleaning/environmental services[1,13,41,58]. 4.1.4 The CPE action plan developed as part of the outbreak action plan should be implemented (see Recommendation 1.1.4), including the use of contact precautions for all suspected or confirmed cases of CPE (see Recommendation 3.1.1), monitoring of compliance of the health workforce with contact precautions and provision of feedback (see Recommendation 3.1.3).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%