Professional Ethics for Politicians?

Abstract

According to Michael Walzer, the role morality that governs political actors requires that they be prepared to risk getting 'dirty hands': they should take an action where that is necessary to the achievement of the political goals to which they are committed, even when doing so is nevertheless morally wrong. Walzer implies that the demands of this role morality apply with equal force to all political agents. In this paper I argue against that implication, particularly in relation to political officials -so-called 'professional politicians'.Though politicians are in some ways sui generis, there is enough commonality between them and professional groups for an account of professional ethics to illuminate the political role. In general, roles are teleologically defined, and role morality determined in reference to that end. In the case of both politicians and professionals, the end they serve is the provision of important needs. In order to achieve this end they must be granted an area of executive discretion and be embedded in, committed to and participate in the right kind of institutional framework (in the case of politicians, the state), within which they occupy offices that can be specified independently of the individuals who happen to occupy them.Ultimately, professional politicians qua office holders are obliged to act in ways that contribute to the strength and effectiveness of the state, though in a liberal democratic state, at least, this is compatible with a good deal of political partisanship. Far from it being the case that good faith requires the political actor to do what is necessary to achieve the political goals to which they are personally committed, as Walzer implies; where such action conflicts with the obligations of office, the role morality of the professional politician forbids it. On this approach to political role morality, institutional design is of fundamental importance. A political system needs to be structured so that it at the same time regulates access to political office, constrains the actions of those who possess such office, and provides them with the discretionary power that is needed to deal with the contingencies they will face. The abuse of such discretionary power is a standing temptation to politicians, and appears to be licensed by Walzerian appeals to the necessity to be prepared to get one's hands dirty. It is a temptation that, nevertheless, professional politicians should be alert to, and resist.

Develop the recruitment criteria for professionalisation of politicians: a focus to group study

“…Though, politicians are in some ways of sui generis, there is enough commonality between them and professional groups for an account of professional ethics to illuminate the political role (Alexandra, 2005). Conversely, there exists a close relationship between corrupt practices and the background of the politicians.…”

The ‘strange Mr Kastner’ – Leadership ethics in Holocaust-era Hungary, in the light of grey zones and dirty hands

“…What are we to make of the leader who watches things go by, as opposed to the leader who ‘dirties his hands’ and runs the risk of being condemned by his own once the storm has blown over? In fact, leaders are expected to take the initiative, precisely to avoid being seen as ‘fence-sitters’ who assign the responsibility to act to others: ‘Those acting on the presumption that the end does not justify the means open themselves to the suspicion of being obsessed with … their own moral purity regardless of the cost to others’ (Alexandra, 2007: 76–91).…”

Judging politicians: The role of political attentiveness in shaping how people evaluate the ethical behaviour of their leaders

“…Yet, insofar as it is possible to distinguish clearly between them, we are interested in the latter and particularly in judgments about the rights and wrongs of conduct. Political theorists and those charged with regulating institutional political conduct, such as parliamentary ethics officers and committees, have elaborated understandings of political ethics in terms of norms that pertain to the role of elected office holders (e.g., Alexandra : 89; Hampshire : 48–52; Philp : 152–163; Thompson : 96–122; : 11–25). These norms almost always rest on a distinction between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’, according to which the actions of public officials are distinguished from those of individuals in their private lives or in the private sector by virtue of the fact that they are chosen to act in the public interest.…”