Problematika Pengaturan Cuti Kampanye Bagi Incumbent Dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah di Indonesia

Ghafur, Jamaludin; Wardhana, Allan Fatchan Gani

doi:10.26555/novelty.v8i1.a5522

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…According to Jimly and Sri Soemantri, this system is called the third government system model, namely a mixed system or hybrid system. 20 These countries are the Netherlands and Israel. In this country, the prime minister is elected directly by the people like members of the legislature, but the king or queen is still retained as head of state as is the case in the Netherlands.…”

Section: Dynamics Of the Presidential Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Model of Cabinet Relationship With Regional Government in the Era of Regional Autonomy

Satriawan,

Arinanto,

Latifah

2024

J. of Law and Sust. Develop.

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Purpose: To propose a new model of relations between the central cabinet and local governments in the context of regional autonomy. Measures such as the formation of a linear presidential coalition party with coalition parties supporting regional heads, simplification of political parties, and improvement of the political system aim to create a more harmonious and effective relationship between the two entities in the implementation of public policies in the era of regional autonomy. Method: The method used in this research is a normative research method using a statutory approach Results and Conclusion: The relationship between the central cabinet and local governments in Indonesia is influenced by the suitability of supporting political parties. Nonconformity can lead to disharmony. Therefore, a new model of relations is needed that involves a coalition of political parties that are more in line between the cabinet and local governments. Measures such as increasing electoral thresholds, simplifying political parties, and institutional strengthening of political parties are proposed. This is expected to create clarity and enhance cooperation between the two entities for more effective implementation of public policies. Implications of research: The need for the establishment of a new model of relations between the central cabinet and local governments involving a more conformed coalition of political parties, simplification of political parties in every election, institutional strengthening of political parties, and a shift towards an ideology-based coalition. These measures are expected to enhance harmonization in relations between the two entities, strengthen the political system, and bring clarity in policy formation.

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Section: Dynamics Of the Presidential Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Model of Cabinet Relationship With Regional Government in the Era of Regional Autonomy

Satriawan,

Arinanto,

Latifah

2024

J. of Law and Sust. Develop.

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“…SA membenarkan bahwa dengan aplikasi TikTok memang membuat ia kreatif membuat video-video namun juga terkadang lupa waktu untuk mengerjakan pekerjaan rumah, tugas kampus bahkan lupa waktu shalat. Maka dari itu sudah tidak memiliki aplikasi TikTok lagi, karena sangat dilarang oleh Orang Tuanya (8). Dalam tulisan ini akan dibahas tentang pengaruh penggunaan aplikasi TikTok dikalangan mahasiswa terhadap menurut pandangan Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) di Kota Bengkulu.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Examining the Presidential Threshold in Law No. 7 of 2017 in terms of legal politics in Indonesia

Fathullah

2023

J.Pengabdian

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It was originally proposed that the presidential threshold of 20% be used to support the presidential system. As stated in Article 6A paragraph (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the constitutional design of the presidential threshold is an additional provision about arrangements on the requirements for the candidacy of the President and Vice President. Because political configuration is so crucial to the creation of legal products, political law presidential threshold policymaking occurs when there is political configuration. What is the history of the presidential threshold policy of 20%? is the first of two problem formulations in this study. Second, how does the presidential threshold of 20% in Law No. 7 of 2017 stand in terms of legal politics? Along with legal and intellectual techniques, the research takes a normative perspective. First, the study's findings show that Indonesia's presidential threshold was first established in Law Number 23 of 2003 concerning the General Election of the President and Vice President. From the 2004 Presidential Election to the 2019 Presidential Election, Indonesia's threshold provisions were the first to be put into practice, with the presidential threshold's amount changing. The legal politics of the presidential threshold have the traits of an authoritarian law, and the legal foundation has changed to Law Number 7 of 2017 concerning the Second General Election. This is so that the ruler can protect his or her political interest in keeping the ruling party in power. Because a presidential threshold with a percentage of up to 20% creates a divide in political rights or democratic rights between parties with majority votes and parties with minority votes, the legal politics of determining the presidential threshold runs counter to the principle of the purpose of an effective and proportional election.

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“…It must include the democratic principle and the value of democracy in this implementation. The rule of law principles will give some guaranties for the human rights inside [5]. In a rule of law understanding, both rechtsstaats and the rule of law, the guarantee for human rights is an important part [6].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Obligation to Resign Legislative Members in Regional Election: Is There Unequal Treatment?

Aditya¹,

Fuadi²,

Yulistyaputri³

2021

Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Education, Humanities, Health and Agriculture, ICEHHA 2021, 3-4 June 2021, R

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This article discusses the obligation resignation of members of the House of Representative/district (DPR/DPRD) when it will run into the head region. As a political position, DPR/DPRD members who run for Regional Heads required to resign first as mandated by the Constitutional Court Decision Number 57/PUU-XI/2013. It is considered as a form of injustice because the minister and incumbent as a political position are not required to resign. Even though the minister or incumbent's potential for abuse of power is enormous but only needed to take leave during the campaign. Besides, in practice, the abuse of the region head's authority often found the use of positions to mobilize employees in the regions. Members of the DPR/DPRD do not own this authority because they have no mass base and areas. Some of the questions that will answer in this article are. (1) whether there has been unequal treatment in this matter? (2) what are the constitutional Court considerations in determining the legal politics of this matter? and (3) Is the obligation to resign members of the DPR/DPRD still following the development of the political system in Indonesia?

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Problematika Pengaturan Cuti Kampanye Bagi Incumbent Dalam Pemilihan Kepala Daerah dan Wakil Kepala Daerah di Indonesia

Abstract: Abstrak

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Model of Cabinet Relationship With Regional Government in the Era of Regional Autonomy

Model of Cabinet Relationship With Regional Government in the Era of Regional Autonomy

Examining the Presidential Threshold in Law No. 7 of 2017 in terms of legal politics in Indonesia

Obligation to Resign Legislative Members in Regional Election: Is There Unequal Treatment?

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