Private International Trade in the Shadow of the Territoriality of Law: Why Does It Work?

Schmidt-Trenz, Hans-Jörg; Schmidtchen, Dieter

doi:10.2307/1060177

Cited by 19 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Private ordering refers to self-help, hostage giving, relational contracts (contracts as governance structures built for long-term relationships), conventions and agreements on rules for settling disputes that could otherwise be brought to court (see Rühl 2010;Schmidt-Trenz and Schmidtchen 1991;Schmidtchen and Schmidt-Trenz 2006). The multinational firm and vertical integration across borders are further examples of private ordering.…”

Section: B Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic analysis of international law

Aaken¹,

Stradner²

2021

Research Methods in International Law

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Section: B Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic analysis of international law

Aaken¹,

Stradner²

2021

Research Methods in International Law

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“…29. For treatments of private trade across state boundaries, see Benson (1989), Milgrom et al (1990), Schmidt-Trenz andSchmidtchen (1991) and Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1992). Greif et al (1994) and explore institutional innovation to support trade across boundaries.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Contractual Role of Boundaries: Law and Economics Meets International Organization

Yarbrough

2003

European Journal of International Relations

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Without universally efficacious contract enforcement, contracting boundaries divide the world into ‘insiders’, with whom we contract freely, and ‘outsiders’, with whom contracting is circumscribed. Boundary types vary and vacillate between territorially defined ones and ones defined on nonterritorial margins (religion, ethnicity or functional specialization). Sovereignty, or sole legal constitutional authority, has always existed alongside other, less formal systems of contractual enforcement. Both early law and economics and early International Relations theory largely ignored this interacting, overlapping web of enforcement institutions; and recent world events highlight the limitations of theories in which the nature of boundaries — and hence the nature of entities themselves — has little impact on the nature of predicted interactions. The contracting branch of law and economics contains useful insights into the material functions of boundaries, the strengths and weaknesses of different types of boundary-maintenance devices, the characteristics necessary for ‘successful’ boundaries and why different types of boundaries might emerge or persist under different conditions. These insights suggest that the coexistence of and historical vacillation between territorially defined boundaries and ones defined on nonterritorial margins should not come as a surprise.

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“…In any case, contractual certainty is not provided by the PIL. In fact a constitutional uncertainty exists, which hampers, rather than enables, cross-border exchange (Schmidt-Trenz 1990, 241–44; Schmidt-Trenz and Schmidtchen 1991).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract Law, Relational Contracts, and Reputational Networks in International Trade: An Empirical Investigation into Cross-Border Contracts in the Software Industry

Dietz¹

2012

Law soc. inq.

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The following case study investigates the contract enforcement institutions that enable German customers to purchase software in Asia and Eastern Europe. The case study shows that nation‐states are hardly able to generate a legal “shadow” for cross‐border business relations. The same holds true for the so‐called New Lex Mercatoria. Instead, economic actors create their own informal mechanisms. Relational contracts and reputational networks are nowadays far more effective due to developments in the field of information and communication technology. Overall, the importance of formal contract law in international trade is even smaller than is assumed by the classic theory of relational contracts.

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Private International Trade in the Shadow of the Territoriality of Law: Why Does It Work?

Cited by 19 publications

References 18 publications

Economic analysis of international law

Economic analysis of international law

The Contractual Role of Boundaries: Law and Economics Meets International Organization

Contract Law, Relational Contracts, and Reputational Networks in International Trade: An Empirical Investigation into Cross-Border Contracts in the Software Industry

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