Spatial innovation models focus on the region and highlight the social and economic interactions of the actors as a main factor in regional innovative output. This paper examines the role of German chambers of commerce and industry (CCIs), which could be relevant for the innovation process through: (1) moderating or founding regional and local (innovative) initiatives; (2) creating and maintaining formal and informal networks; (3) building reputations and providing references; (4) providing information and advisory services; (5) conducting final examinations in vocational training; and (6) founding educational institutions. The empirical analyses show a positive impact of CCI expenditures on the number of start-ups and the number of patents, as well as a positive impact of seminar and information day participation on the number of start-ups. The results lead to the assumption that the network effect (functions 2 and 3) plays a more important role than providing pure information and advice (function 4).

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The present paper starts from the observation that there is still no analysis of private law as a basis for international trade, i. e. private transactions between noncompatriots (cf. Schmidt-Trenz 1990). Although authors like Buchanan, Hayek, Williamson, B6hm and Eucken have talked about the significance of a system of private law for the coordination of private transactions, they left out of their analysis the domain of protective state activity in international private business transactions vis-a-vis the multitude of legal orders and national enforcement organs.It is the intention of this paper to focus upon the problems of the coordination of private foreign trade activities in the shadow of the territoriality of law. Specifically, it is .asked: What are the causes for the fragmentation of private law in the world, and what are the consequences of the territoriality of law for the coordination of decisions concerning transactions between non-compatriots? The paper also deals with the question of how international coordination-efficiency can be fostered by international constitutional policy."The theory of international trade tells us that word economy rests on the law of comparative costs, but recent experience suggests that it would be truer to say that it ultimately rests on the maxim 'pacta sunt servanda'." (Rrpke, 1959: 76f.) * We are indebted to Jack Wiseman for helpful comments.

Abstract. The social contract theory of J.M. Buchanan provides no clear-cut answer on the question which one of the multitude of possible Pareto-efficient contracts is chosen by individuals who shape a contract in an (imaginary) state of nature. This deficiency is remedied in this paper by adding the Nash-bargaining theory. It seems to be in line with at least part of Buchanan's reasoning. Whereas for Buchanan the configuration of contract depends unilaterally on the natural equilibrium of the state of nature, we are able to show that the parties' (rational) contractual expectations have repercussions for their behavior in the state of nature. That is why the location of the natural equilibrium proves to be heavily dependent on the chosen bargaining theory. The implication is that assessing the legitimacy of a given constitutional order or contract (on the basis of the natural equilibrium) depends on the particular bargaining theory chosen to solve the underlying constitutional distribution problem.

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