The Contractual Role of Boundaries: Law and Economics Meets International Organization

Yarbrough, Beth V.; Yarbrough, Robert M.

doi:10.1177/135406610394002

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 97 publications

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“…For example, in 1986, Bahrain employed a Dutch firm to build a coast guard station at the contested Fasht Al Dibal reef. But Qatari helicopters seized the twenty-nine workers of the Dutch firm, claiming they (Yarbrough and Yarbrough 2003). Obversely, territorial and border conflicts increase risks for private economic agents.…”

Section: Simmons / Rules Over Real Estate 827mentioning

confidence: 97%

Rules over Real Estate

Simmons¹

2005

Journal of Conflict Resolution

127

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Territorial disputes between governments generate a significant amount of uncertainty for economic actors. Settled boundary agreements produce benefits to economic agents on both sides of the border. These qualities of borders are missed both by realists, who view territorial conflicts in overly zero-sum terms, and globalists, who claim borders are increasingly irrelevant. Settled borders help to secure property rights, signal much greater jurisdictional and policy certainty, and thereby reduce the transactions costs associated with international economic transactions. The plausibility of this claim is examined by showing that territorial disputes involve significant economic opportunity costs in the form of foregone bilateral trade. Theories of territorial politics should take into account the possibility of such joint gains in their models of state dispute behavior.

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Section: Simmons / Rules Over Real Estate 827mentioning

confidence: 97%

Rules over Real Estate

Simmons¹

2005

Journal of Conflict Resolution

127

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“…The jigsaw image was immediately accepted by the different community representatives and helped build a 'rhetorical bridge' (Hoppe 2002(Hoppe , 2005 or shared understanding that could convey and manage the broader contextual climate; the historical conflict and contestation over fact; complexity; ongoing scientific uncertainty; and the existence of limited resources for investigation and resolution. It also helped the community accept ESR's limited power and mandate, enabling ESR to position and reposition itself according to scientific and policy demarcations, divisions of labour, resources and contractual boundaries, whereby ESR was positioned as a transient player with limited scope beyond its scientific expertise (Yarbrough & Yarbrough 2003).…”

Section: Strategies For Rhetorical Bridgingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Difficult Data: Boundary Dynamics, Public Engagement and Bridging Technologies in a Science/Policy Controversy

Baker¹,

Fowles²,

Phillips³

2010

East Asian Science

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In 2001, the New Zealand Ministry of Health (MoH) contracted the Institute of Environmental Science and Research Ltd. (ESR) to undertake a serum dioxin study to determine exposure (current and historical) to dioxins for residents living in close proximity to the former Ivon Watkins Dow chemical plant in Paritutu, New Plymouth. In the years that the plant had operated, a number of activist groups had organised in the community to ask the government to respond to their concerns about possible exposure and any links to adverse health effects. The members of these groups were angry and frustrated. They distrusted industry and the various government agencies involved, and felt that previous scientific studies had marginalised their concerns. This paper explores the processes that enabled ESR to work with the community to produce a robust scientific study. Key dynamics, lessons, methods and mechanisms critical to the success of this intervention are appraised. This paper offers theoretical reflection on boundary work between science, policy and community and focuses on the challenges in including local knowledge to produce 'useable knowledge' in this case.

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“…Conversely, the implications of international trade on desiged CEIs have barely been considered. (Although see Greif 1992;Yarbrough and Yarbrough 2003. ) Various contract enforcement institutions-private and public, organic and designed-have their distinct advantages and disadvantages and each complements and substitutes for the other.…”

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confidence: 99%

Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange

Greif¹

Handbook of New Institutional Economics

145

106

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Markets rest upon institutions. The development of market-based exchange relies on the support of two institutional pillars that are, in turn, shaped by the development of markets. Research in the field of new institutional economics has largely focused upon one such institutional pillar-'contract-enforcement institutions'-that determine the range of transactions in which individuals can commit to keep their contractual obligations. Yet, markets also require institutions that constrain those with coercive power from abusing others' property rights. These 'coercion-constraining' institutions influence whether individuals will bring their goods to the market in the first place. This chapter's discussion of market-supporting institutions is geared toward the issues we know the least about. First, the dynamics of market-supporting institutions and the implied dynamics of markets; second, the inter-relationships between the dynamics of market-supporting and political institutions where the latter comprise the rules for collective decision-making, political rights, and the legitimate use of coercive power. It argues, in particular, that neither the assertion that liberal political institutions lead to markets nor that markets lead to liberal governance are supported by theory or history. Markets and political institutions co-evolve through a dynamic inter-play between contract-enforcement and coercion-constraining institutions.Many successful market economies have prevailed in the past; there were adequate market-supporting institutions. Early successes, such as those in the Islamic world or China, were not indicators of later development. It was the commercial expansion that began in Europe during the late medieval period that led to the development of markets that support the complex, dynamic modern economy with its wide-scale reliance on impersonal exchange. Why didn't early success lead to subsequent market expansion? More generally, what does determine the dynamics of market expansion? Addressing these questions is a key to understanding the 'Rise of the West,' the operation of market economies, and the factors that still hinder market development.The argument advanced here is that markets can rest on different combinations of contract-enforcement and coercion-constraining institutions.

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The Contractual Role of Boundaries: Law and Economics Meets International Organization

Cited by 6 publications

References 97 publications

Rules over Real Estate

Rules over Real Estate

Difficult Data: Boundary Dynamics, Public Engagement and Bridging Technologies in a Science/Policy Controversy

Commitment, Coercion, and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange

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