Prisoner's dilemma on competing retailers' investment in green supply chain management

Yan, Yingchen; Zhao, Ruiqing; Chen, Huiru

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.02.229

Cited by 37 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…When the retailer invests less efficiently in green products, the retailer will not necessarily earn higher profits due to green costs, etc. [2]. Considering the reverse logistics of supply chains, Hosseini-Motlagh et al [12] studied the impact of a manufacturer's energy-saving effort and re-manufacturing on environmental sustainability, as well as the optimal decisions of two competing retailers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, the product demand d i of supply chain i increases with its effort of green investment a i and its effort of undertaking cooperative promotional activities b i [10,33]. This study also assumes that the two supply chains' actions have symmetric effects, i.e., the effects of the prices on demand β, the effects of their efforts of undertaking cooperative promotional activities on demand θ, and the effect of the effort of investing in greenness, on demand α are the same in each demand function [2,36].…”

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Over the past few decades, consumers have become increasingly concerned about the low-carbon economy and public environmental issues, so manufacturers have begun to increase their green investments to design environmentally green products [2]. Meanwhile, governments also support the green investments of enterprises-e.g., the US government provides subsidies to enterprises for purchasing electric vehicles [3], the Indian government has conducted a series of financial schemes to stimulate the widespread use of LED lights [4], and the Malaysian government has introduced a series of tax breaks and coupons to stimulate consumers to buy green products [5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Green Supply Chain Management with Cooperative Promotion

2021

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Green supply chain management has received increasing attention as consumers have become more environmentally conscious. Manufacturers are making green investments to meet consumers’ demands, while retailers in different markets often engage in cooperative promotion to attract more consumers. This study develops game theoretic models for investigating cooperative promotion for two cross-market firms with different channel structures, i.e., decentralized and centralized. The manufacturer determines the wholesale price for the retailers and the green investment of a product, and the retailers determine the promotional effort and retail price. This study finds that whether the firms join in cooperative promotion mainly depends on the wholesale price, as well as the impacts of the price, green investment, and cooperative promotional activities on the demand. When the wholesale price is relatively low, the retail price of the decentralized green supply chain must be lower than that of the centralized green supply chain. On the contrary, the difference in the retail price between the two green supply chains varies with the impacts of green investment and cooperative promotional activities on demand. In addition, due to the influence of channel structure, the contribution to cooperative promotion of the centralized supply chain is more than that of the decentralized supply chain with the most given conditions. Moreover, as the impact of cooperative promotional activities on demand increases, the centralized green supply chain does not necessarily result in higher profits than the decentralized green supply chain.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Model Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Green Supply Chain Management with Cooperative Promotion

2021

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“…(4) To improve the greenness level, the government subsidizes the manufacturer. According to Yang and Xiao [31], Li et al [33]; Yan et al [34], and Zhang et al [35], θ g expresses the unit product subsidy received by the manufacturer. (5) e government subsidizes the retailer on the basis of the selling cost, and μe 2 g expresses the total amount of subsidies received by the retailer.…”

Section: Model Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

2020

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Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.

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“…. Similar utility function has been wildly adopted in the literature (Zheng et al [11], Yan et al [31]).…”

Section: Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed Loop Supply Chain under Power Configurations and Dual Competitions

Liu

Zhang

2018

Sustainability

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This paper investigates pricing and collecting decisions in a closed loop supply chain (CLSC) under different power configurations and dual competitions. If the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) could sell products directly and collect used products, OEM has to compete with both forward retailer and reverse collector, simultaneously, and OEM possesses different bargaining powers. Specifically, we examine the following models: (1) M1: OEM holds the first position in both forward and reverse channels; (2) M2: OEM holds the first (second) position in the forward (reverse) channel; (3) M3: OEM holds the second position in both channels. We conduct a systematic comparison of forward competition, reverse competition and dual competitions across the above models. From the perspective of the entire supply chain, the outcome of model selection hinges on the extent of competition. If the competition is sufficient, two forward leaders will engage in a price battle which results in great losses for both. Then M1 is preferred. Otherwise, M3 outperforms.

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Prisoner's dilemma on competing retailers' investment in green supply chain management

Cited by 37 publications

References 41 publications

Green Supply Chain Management with Cooperative Promotion

Green Supply Chain Management with Cooperative Promotion

Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

Closed Loop Supply Chain under Power Configurations and Dual Competitions

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